Pressure Groups Under MMP: a Study of Behaviour and Influence by Buckle, Samuel Marcus
 1
 
 
 
 
Pressure Groups Under MMP:  
A Study of Behaviour and Influence 
 
by 
Sam Buckle 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2009 
 2
Contents 
                 Page No 
 
 
Abbreviations         4 
 
Abstract         5 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction to Pressure Groups and MMP    7 
 
A Pressure Group Culture        
The Adoption of MMP         
The “Rules of the Game” 
 
Chapter 2 – Expectations of Pressure Groups under MMP   15 
 
Pressure Groups and State Structure 
Fragmentation of Power 
Methods of Influence, Insiders versus Outsiders 
Relationships and Points of Access 
Select Committees 
The Bureaucracy 
Media and Mobilisation 
Information 
Five Hypotheses for Examination 
 
Chapter 3 – The Structural Context for MMP Pressure Groups   40 
 
Real but Variable Fragmentation of Power 
A Shift in Political Culture 
Non-Legislative Tools of Government 
 
Chapter 4 – Interviews and Case Studies     52  
 
A Qualitative Research Methodology 
Expert Interviews 
Public Policy Case Studies 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
Waste Minimisation Bill 
Taxation Bill 
Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 
 
Chapter 5 –Pressure Group Behaviour and Influence Examined   78 
 
Examining the Pressure Group Hypotheses 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions       104 
 
Pragmatism, Flexibility, Independence 
Blurring of Insiders and Outsiders 
Complexity and Sophistication 
 3
 
References         113 
 
Appendix A – Interview Template      120 
 
Appendix B –  Brief Interviewee Biographies     122
 4
Abbreviations 
 
 
 
ACT – Association of Consumers and Taxpayers 
 
ENPP – Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 
 
ETS – Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
FPP – First-past-the-post 
 
GPG – Guinness Peat Group 
 
KFA – Kyoto Forest Association 
 
MMP – Mixed Member Proportional 
 
MP – Member of Parliament 
 
NGO – Non-government Organisation 
 
NLTF – National Land Transport Fund 
 
NZCTU – New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
 
NZEEBW - New Zealand Energy and Environment Business Week 
 
NZPA – New Zealand Press Association 
 
RTF – Road Transport Forum 
 
SEAFIC – Seafood Industry Council 
 
SMRANZ – Scrap Metal Retailers Association of New Zealand 
 
SOP – Supplementary Order Paper 
 
UK – United Kingdom 
 
US – United States 
 
 5
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of MMP on pressure group behaviour and strategies. MMP 
altered the distribution of public policy decision-making power. As a consequence, it was 
expected to influence the strategies and behaviours of pressure groups seeking to influence 
public policy. The thesis finds that most expectations of pressure groups under MMP have 
been borne out. In particular, pressure groups have developed a wider range of political 
relationships and access points, have achieved more success through engagement with 
select committees and have been more willing to lobby and campaign publicly in opposition 
to Executive policy. In addition, it finds pressure groups have adopted an increasingly flexible 
and politically independent mentality and it finds there has been a blurring of boundaries 
between insider and outsider pressure groups. Finally, it concludes that policy influence has 
become more complex under MMP and created the need for increased pressure group 
sophistication. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces New Zealand’s pluralist traditions as well as the history and importance 
of pressure group activity. It describes the rationale for the adoption of MMP and the 
relationship between this electoral system and the public policy process – “the rules of the 
game” – within which pressure groups operate and seek to influence. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the core political theory that underpins pressure group 
behaviour under different electoral systems – including theories of state structure and of 
weak and strong legislatures. It outlines the various methods of influence available to 
pressure groups and reviews the international literature to identify the main themes, 
strategies and tendencies that might be expected of pressure groups in an MMP 
environment. These include a drift in emphasis from Ministers and the bureaucracy to 
 6
Parliament and a broadening of Parliamentary relationships, a stronger focus on select 
committees, increased media and mobilisation activity, as well as some additional emphasis 
on quality information and political gamesmanship. These expectations are set out as five 
hypotheses for examination 
 
Chapter 3 discusses and reviews the extent and nature of structural change to public policy 
decision-making in New Zealand under MMP – as an important context for the analysis of 
pressure group behaviour. It finds that MMP has delivered substantial structural change to 
the distribution of decision-making power, but that this has been highly variable and 
changed from one term of government to the next. 
 
Chapter 4 first describes the methodology used for researching and reviewing pressure 
group behaviour and strategies under MMP. It sets out a qualitative approach that involved 
a mixture of expert interviews and public policy case studies.  
 
Chapter 5 returns to and examines the five hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 and concludes 
that most expectations have been met, particularly the development of broader 
Parliamentary relationships by pressure groups.  
 
Chapter 6 sets out those key conclusions and underlying themes beyond examination of the 
five hypotheses.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to Pressure Groups and MMP 
 
A Pressure Group Culture 
 
New Zealand has a pluralistic democracy. Governments are elected to make decisions on 
behalf of the population, but it is expected those decisions will be influenced by external 
pressures. Some influence is channelled via formal and highly legitimised institutions, such 
as Parliament and its select committees. Some is exerted via informal networks, the media 
and a range of campaign tools and techniques. And while there is, from time to time, public 
concern, suspicion or even accusation over the methods of influence adopted by certain 
pressure groups1 or the extent of influence enjoyed by a particular group over a political 
party or the policy agenda2, the role of pressure groups is an accepted feature of public and 
political life in this country. 
 
In arguably the most comprehensive New Zealand academic work on pressure groups, Les 
Cleveland wrote that “central to the successful management of conflict is the democratic 
proposition that out of the clash of opinions over some problem or issue, the most 
acceptable course of action will present itself as the end product of a lengthy and 
complicated sequence of grumbling, complaint, interest-seeking, exploration and possible 
course of action, clarification of issues, criticism, debate, public-opinion sounding, expert 
consultation, reaching for consensus, formulation of policy, and final decision-making” 
(Cleveland  1972, 1). Cleveland may be open to accusations of bullish optimism, as it does 
not always seem to work out so tidily, but he did reflect, quite nicely, New Zealand’s 
                                                 
1 For example, there has been concern about the influence of financial contributions to political parties (Young 
2008, Norman 2008[a]).  
2 For example, the New Zealand Business Roundtable has been identified by some commentators as bearing an 
unhealthy influence over policy during the 1980s and 1990s (Harris and Twiname 1998, Laugesen 2005). 
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tolerance of both pluralism’s inefficiencies and the pursuit of interests. Thirty three years 
later, in 2007 and 2008, public and media reaction to constraints on third party political 
advertising in the Electoral Finance Act 20073 illustrated the continuing strength of support 
for pressure group activity as a legitimate element of democratic debate. 
 
Pressure group activity in New Zealand is not just accepted, it is also important and 
influential. Political theorists vigorously debate the extent to which public policy is shaped 
and driven by politicians and political parties as opposed to public opinion and pressure 
groups, but it is hard to dispute that in New Zealand at least, whatever the actual balance of 
influence, pressure groups play a substantial role in shaping our public policies. In addition 
to the influence of politicians, political parties and the media, the outcome of democracy 
and government in this country depends, “to a very considerable extent, on the strength, 
range of activity, resourcefulness and persistence of pressure groups” (Cleveland 1972, 1).  
 
New Zealand has a rich history of pressure group activity and influence to explore. There are 
the high profile, high intensity, popular pressure movements that rose up in relation to 
specific events and issues such as female suffrage, the Vietnam War or homosexual law 
reform.4 There are the more subtle, often broader and longer term influence campaigns 
based on networks and relationships, undertaken by major corporate and sectoral interests, 
such as Federated Farmers, the Council of Trade Unions, environmental non-government 
organisations (NGOs), or the major telecommunications companies (Long 2006). There are 
also the thousands of submissions and representations made by individuals and groups of 
                                                 
3 The Electoral Finance Act 2007 sought to place limits on electoral advertising and introduce greater 
transparency. It drew fierce opposition from the media, from some political parties and from a range of interest 
and pressure groups – broadly on the grounds that through a mixture of confusion and over-zealous 
requirements the Act infringed on the ability of the public to express views and participate in the democratic 
process. It was repealed by the National-led government in February 2009. 
4 See New Zealand History Online – www.nzhistory.net.nz  
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the general public in relation to an ongoing flow of policy, funding and legislative issues.5 
Pressure group activity is a ubiquitous feature of New Zealand society and politics. Every 
day, media report or record some form of pressure group activity – from a march on 
Parliament to a select committee submission to a simple public statement about the latest 
government policy announcement.6  
 
There are many forms of pressure groups and there have been many attempts to categorise 
and define them - from groups that people are born into to those they opt to join, from 
those which are long-term institutions to those that emerge in relation to a specific issue or 
event and then disappear. “Some are national, others local; some are giants firmly rooted in 
the public mind, others are little known” (Watts 2007, 4). This thesis is broadly concerned 
with those groups or organisations that Almond described as “associational” in 1960 
(Almond and Coleman 1960, 115) – which people join in order to protect or promote either 
their own interests or those of a chosen cause. However, individual companies, for instance, 
are also within its scope.  
 
Distinctions are sometimes made between pressure groups and movements, companies or 
think tanks (Watts 2007, 6-12, Grant and Allan 1989, 3-11). This thesis is primarily focused 
on intent and behaviour rather than form. It is concerned with those groups or organisations 
- whatever their membership, history or structure – that seek to influence government 
policy. This is similar to the approach taken by Watts, who concluded that “a pressure group 
is an organisation which is not a political party but which seeks to influence government 
through the political process, in order that it can affect the development of public policy” 
                                                 
5 For instance, the Finance and Expenditure Committee received 259 written submissions and heard 96 oral 
submissions in relation to the Emissions Trading Scheme legislation alone in 2008 (Chauvel 2008). 
6 See www.scoop.co.nz – a media website that collects most of the pressure group media statements issued each 
day in New Zealand. It is not uncommon for 20-25 different pressure group statements concerning a variety of 
policy or political issues to be issued on any single day. 
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and that “all of the classifications alluded to have been the subject of regular criticism, 
encouraging writers such as Rhodes and others to place more emphasis on the way in which 
policy emerges rather than on the types of groups involved in its creation” (Watts 2007, 13). 
 
Every instance of pressure group activity, and every one of the examples mentioned above, 
has a unique plot, circumstance, set of characters and outcome. In each case, the pressure 
groups involved applied a different strategy (or lack of) and different mix of campaign and 
influence techniques. The success or otherwise of pressure group activity has a major 
bearing on public policy outcomes. That success, in turn, is heavily influenced by pressure 
group strategy and behaviour.  This thesis is about those strategies and that behaviour.  
 
The Adoption of MMP 
 
In a 1993 referendum the public voted in favour of changing New Zealand’s electoral system 
from First Past the Post (FPP)7 to Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP)8, by a 
margin of 53.9 per cent to 46.1 per cent. The subsequent advent of MMP (first used for the 
1996 national election), a form of proportional Parliamentary representation, delivered 
significant political and constitutional change. It changed the shape, composition and size of 
Parliament and redistributed power across different political institutions.  
 
Perhaps because of their importance and the uncertain consequences of change, national 
electoral systems are not often changed. Electoral systems are, from time to time, 
incrementally modified and adjusted, but they have rarely been overhauled. According to 
                                                 
7 Under FPP, the country is divided into a series of geographic constituencies. The candidate with the most votes 
in any electorate is elected to Parliament and the party with the most elected MPs forms the government.  
8 Under MMP the number of party members elected to Parliament reflects the proportion of votes received by 
each party. MMP differs from a pure proportional representation model by including members (approximately 
half the total number of MPs) elected by a geographic constituency (or electorate). These constituency MPs are 
deducted from the total number of a party’s Parliamentary representatives to retain overall proportionality. 
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John Wallace, former chair of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System and first 
chairman of New Zealand’s Electoral Commission, “At the time of the Royal Commission 
Report [1986] there were very few instances of a country making a major change to its 
electoral system in other than revolutionary or near revolutionary circumstance” (Wallace 
2002, 50). The novelty of New Zealand’s electoral shift is part of its academic allure. It is 
something that has interested political analysts and commentators in the vast range of 
political changes that have flowed from the introduction of MMP.  
 
It was not always anticipated or intended that MMP would bring about extensive 
constitutional changes. The initial drivers of electoral change in New Zealand were more 
modest and limited in scope. The important Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, Towards a Better Democracy (Royal Commission 1986), was heavily focused on 
electoral issues, and particularly the issue of ‘representation’. Six of the ten electoral 
assessment criteria used by the Royal Commission in preparing its report were explicitly 
concerned with representation and according to Sir Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer, “The 
logic of that report [Towards a Better Democracy] was founded firmly on the performance of 
the electoral system rather than upon the wider constitutional and structural issues … ” 
(Palmer and Palmer 2004, 13). The election-focused nature of that report is not surprising 
given public confidence in the FPP electoral system had been affected by a series of electoral 
anomalies and outcomes that had highlighted the representative limitations of that system. 
In both the 1978 and 1981 general elections, the National Party had secured the control of 
both the executive and Parliament despite receiving fewer total votes than the Labour Party. 
Further, despite receiving more than 20 per cent of the popular vote in 1981, the Social 
Credit Party was rewarded with only two MPs. In 1984, the New Zealand Party did not 
achieve a single MP despite securing more than 12 per cent of the total vote.  
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The latter part of the 1980s would deliver another, more constitutionally-focused, rationale 
for electoral change – the need to check the power of the Executive and compel a more 
consultative public policy decision-making process. Discomfort with the speed and extent of 
economic restructuring during the 1980s, plus the immediate social and economic 
displacement that resulted - arguably beyond the limit of public tolerance – fed the public 
appetite for electoral and constitutional change. Indeed, FPP became broadly associated 
with market liberal ideals during this period (at least as far as the former was perceived to 
make the latter possible). This placed New Zealand’s long-standing electoral system in a very 
vulnerable position as opposition to the 1980s economic agenda intensified. Richard Mulgan 
was one who drew a connection between the 1980s economic reforms and FPP when he 
wrote that “New Zealand’s democracy falls well short of the ideal standards set by the 
principles of pluralist democracy and, arguably, became even less equal and less democratic 
in the decade of restructuring,”. He also claimed, in reference to the introduction of MMP, 
that “In so far as the new constitutional arrangements will impose a greater degree of 
consultation and compromise, they may be seen as a victory for the principles of democratic 
pluralism” (Mulgan 1994, 322). 
 
By the time New Zealand was organising for a referendum on MMP in 1993, core 
constitutional issues such as Executive power, the role of Parliament and the need for more 
consultative government had become a key aspect of the philosophical battleground. They 
have featured strongly in academic literature and political commentary about the 
consequences and implications of MMP ever since. 
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The “Rules of the Game” 
 
The relationship between an electoral system, in this case MMP, and pressure group 
strategy may not, at a glance, seem direct. Yet it is fundamental because the electoral 
system is intimately linked to the shape of a country’s political institutions and constitutional 
arrangements. It determines the size and composition of Parliament and, in turn, the 
respective powers of the Executive and Parliament. Accordingly, it has a major bearing on 
how public policy decisions are made. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer observed, “the rules of the 
constitution set up the rules of the political game,” and “the political game is important 
because the public policy outcomes of the country are determined by it” (Palmer and Hill 
2002, 205). As rules change, it can expected the behaviour of the players involved and 
affected, including pressure groups, will adapt.  
 
Analysing pressure group behaviour in a political context is always difficult, given much 
activity takes place out of the public eye. Assessing pressure group performance is even 
more difficult given that public policy decisions are always the result of many contributing 
factors, decisions, motives and events.  Nevertheless, there is extensive literature about how 
MMP redistributed decision-making power and re-organised the decision-making process. 
There is also considerable international literature discussing the strategy and behaviour of 
pressure groups in various constitutional environments, environments which share some of 
the key characteristics of New Zealand FPP or, conversely, New Zealand MMP. In 
conjunction with predictions and observations made by New Zealand academics about 
pressure groups under MMP, there is a sufficient body of knowledge to make some 
informed assumptions about the kind of behaviour and strategies that effective pressure 
groups could be expected to have adopted under MMP.  
 
 14
While there are too many pressure groups and far too many public policy decisions to 
attempt an aggregated performance assessment against those assumptions, it is possible to 
undertake an analysis of selected public policy case studies. It is also possible to interview, in 
depth, political players and experts that have been exposed to and observed the policy 
process, pressure groups, their strategies and behaviour during New Zealand’s twelve years 
of MMP government.  
 
This approach will provide a better understanding as to how New Zealand pressure groups 
have behaved under MMP, the strategies they have applied, whether they have behaved as 
expected; and if not, why not. That is the objective of this thesis.
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Chapter 2 – Expectations of Pressure Groups under MMP  
 
Pressure Groups and State Structure 
 
Pressure group strategy and behaviour is influenced by a myriad of variables. Every pressure 
group is unique and every one operates in its own strategic and political environment. Yet, 
there are some variables that political theorists have tended to identify as being more 
important and having more influence on pressure group behaviour. Ball and Millard 
described a reasonably typical set of internal and external factors, including a group’s aims 
and objectives, organisation, membership, assets and resources, the political system, 
political culture and party system (Ball and Millard 1986, 41-51). Non-political external 
factors, such as the strength of the media and social culture, are other variables that might 
be added to their list, which is certainly not exhaustive. 
 
Each of these variables has been the subject of academic exploration, particularly the 
political system, which can have an enormous influence on the strategies, fortunes and 
influence of pressure groups. The strategic environment and behaviour of a human rights 
group in North Korea will be very different to that of a similar organisation in the 
Netherlands. New Zealand’s shift from FPP to MMP was not a wholesale political upheaval. 
It was more subtle – a variation on a liberal democracy. For that reason much of the 
literature on pressure group behaviour in the context of contrasting political ‘systems’ (e.g. 
democratic versus totalitarian) tends to address issues of such scale and extreme as to be of 
limited value to somebody interested in the adoption of MMP in New Zealand. There are, 
however, some fundamental observations about the impact of state structure on pressure 
groups that apply across any political system and which go to the heart of understanding the 
more specific factors that shape pressure group behaviour.  
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There would be few that dispute the state’s influence on societal players, including pressure 
groups. In fact, there are some ‘statists’ that place strong emphasis on the state as the 
primary determinant of pressure group behaviour and “urge us to look not only at the 
different way in which interest groups attempt to influence states but at the various ways in 
which the state influences interest groups” (Wilson 1990, 33). Wilson also observed that the 
“capacity of the state to shape interests is closely related to the structure of the state itself.”  
Jordan and Richardson have argued that pressure groups are passive or at the mercy of the 
structure of the state. They described pressure groups as “chameleons” and argued “those 
that take their lobbying role seriously adapt their internal organisations and structure to suit 
the policy system in which they happen to operate” (Jordan and Richardson 1987, 147). This 
response – or adaptation - to the state and its structure, whether conscious or otherwise, 
whether immediate or gradual, will have occurred in the wake of the French Revolution, just 
as it will with the adoption of MMP.  
 
Within the wider discourse on political systems, state structure and pressure groups is a 
narrower body of work that revolves around institutional - or constitutional - influences over 
pressure group behaviour, usually within liberal democratic boundaries. It is this work that 
supports informed speculation and assumption about expected pressure group behaviour in 
New Zealand under MMP - because while the introduction of MMP did not constitute 
political revolution, it did deliver substantial constitutional change.  
 
The concept of a constitution requires some clarification in respect to most countries, but 
the need is even more pressing in the New Zealand context, given this country lacks any 
singular constitutional document, such as that found in the United States and, indeed, most 
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western democracies. In fact, it is more appropriate to refer to “constitutional 
arrangements” in relation to New Zealand.  
 
Whatever their particular parts and assembly, constitutions and constitutional arrangements 
matter because they “have to do with the distribution, exercise and control of state power” 
and because they comprise “the rules – written and unwritten – which establish the powers 
and responsibilities of government, and which regulate relationships between the various 
parts of government, and between the government and citizens” (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, 
38).9 These “rules” are critical to pressure group influence and behaviour as they determine 
who decides public policy and how it is decided. Consequently, these rules are at the heart 
of this thesis. 
 
Fragmentation of Power 
 
Much of the literature concerning the behaviour of pressure groups in a constitutional 
context focuses on the strength of the Executive relative to the legislature or Parliament 
and, related to that, the extent to which the public policy decision-making process is 
consolidated or, on the other hand, fragmented. The most common comparison is between 
the constitutional arrangements and pressure groups in the United States and those in the 
United Kingdom, two countries regarded as sitting toward opposite ends of the liberal 
democratic spectrum of Executive strength (at least, in relation to legislation).  The British 
Parliament is regularly characterised as impotent alongside an all powerful Executive. “All 
Executive policy and most legislation is conceived, framed, drafted and all but enacted in 
                                                 
9 It is important to recognise the scope of a country’s constitutional arrangements can be interpreted quite 
broadly and, in the case of New Zealand, can, for instance, be understood to include the Bill of Rights, Treaty of 
Waitangi and the Electoral Finance Act. These components of the constitution might be regarded as being about 
‘rights’ – as opposed to those concerned with process, power and decision-making as is the focus of this thesis.  
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Whitehall” (Devlin Commission 1972, 5). The essential power of the British Executive (and 
relative impotence of its Parliament) rests in a FPP constitutional model that almost 
invariably delivers one party a Parliamentary majority, enabling the Executive to control 
legislation and brush aside Parliament’s dissenting voices.  
 
FPP was New Zealand’s electoral system from the time of the country’s democratic inception 
until 1996. Although the last variation of FPP in New Zealand had different features to the 
British template (for example, New Zealand’s FPP Parliament had fewer MPs and no Upper 
House), it also constrained the role and influence of Parliament. Malone not only described 
Parliament as weak under FPP, but argued that even the Parliamentary caucus of the 
governing party was largely irrelevant. “FPP governments took office on the assumption that 
its back bench would provide it with an automatic majority in the House” (Malone 2008, 61) 
and “the role of the caucus was to peruse, debate and ultimately assent to government bills, 
but not to initiate them” (Malone 2008, 83).  
 
The United States is viewed differently. Institutional and decision-making power is much 
more fragmented. Consequently, “an interest group that is cut out of the political process at 
one level, or loses a battle in one area, can usually find other arenas in which to launch a 
fresh challenge” (Tenbensel 2006, 530). The strength and influence of the legislature is a key 
feature of political decision-making in the United States. This is partly attributable to the 
more explicit division of power between the legislature and the United States Executive.  
 
The reasons are not just structural and constitutional. In particular, United States political 
parties are less disciplined in the sense that elected representatives are far more likely to 
take an independent position on issues or even vote with rival parties. According to Levine 
and Roberts, “The United States literature on legislative behaviour is interesting in part 
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because it (correctly) views its subject matter, U.S. lawmakers, as ‘free agents’, able to 
determine their own destiny and course of action as issues and policies arise …” (Levine and 
Roberts 2004,  42). 
 
While there are still many differences between New Zealand’s MMP constitutional 
arrangements and the United States politico-legislative framework, the move to MMP has 
brought New Zealand closer to the United States in at least some key respects. It has 
involved a “small but significant” shift in power towards Parliament (Shaw and Eichbaum 
2008, 68) and a more fragmented decision-making process. This tempered observation 
contrasts with that of Martin, who argued that MMP has “shifted the balance between 
Parliament and the Executive significantly back towards the former” (Martin 2004, 335). 
Significantly, there has been no single party majority since the advent of MMP. While 
membership of the Executive has continued to be dominated by one party, the Executive’s 
power has been constrained by, in the first instance, the requirement for, and terms of, 
post-election negotiations. Most importantly, it has been constrained by the need to secure 
multi-party support for the passage of all legislation. With successive Labour-led and 
National-led minority governments, that support has had to come from parties not even 
represented within the Executive – making the need for policy compromise even more 
critical. Consequently, “decision-making has become more open and contestable” (Martin 
2004, 335). 
 
Just as a collection of factional groups, potentially spanning both the Democratic and 
Republican parties, need to be brought together to carry legislation through Congress, it  
now takes negotiation and compromise on the part of several  political parties to pass 
legislation in New Zealand. Under MMP, policy-making power in New Zealand has been 
diluted and the decision-making system, certainly the legislative process, has become far 
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more complex, iterative and dependent on negotiation and compromise at several stages. 
As a result, Parliament as an institution has become more influential - as have the individual 
members and parties that comprise Parliament. 
 
The implications of the strengthening of Parliament extend well beyond Parliament itself. It 
will impact on the behaviour of the media, the bureaucracy and, no less, pressure groups. 
Quite predictably, where legislatures are strong (for example, the United States) pressure 
groups devote significant resources to trying to work through them, but where the Executive 
is dominant (for example, the United Kingdom and Japan), pressure groups use different 
tactics – concentrating on persuading Ministers and civil servants to accept their arguments 
(Wilson 1990, 21-33). This is a straightforward proposition – pressure groups will direct their 
energy towards parties and channels with greatest influence. As Robert Presthus wrote of 
Canada, “The Cabinet, of course, is typically regarded as the centre of authority and power 
within the parliamentary system. Its members presumably control the machinery of 
government through their individual command of the great departments, while collectively, 
they determine the major outlines of national policy. Since interest groups seek access at 
critical points in the political system, we should expect frequent interaction between them 
and ministers” (Presthus 1973, 236). 
 
There is, however, more to pressure group strategy under MMP than the commonsense of 
focusing on power. There is the important question as to how that focus on power is best 
achieved. As already discussed, MMP has created a more complex public policy decision-
making environment, not just for the policy-makers themselves, but also for those seeking to 
influence. “The lobbying process is … likely to be more complicated and to occur at a greater 
number of stages of the policy development and legislative process” (Redward 1995, 39). 
Furthermore, as Presthus found in his empirical comparison of US and Canadian pressure 
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groups, not only did the American groups focus more on the legislature (given its relative 
strength and influence in US public policy decision-making), but they also displayed greater 
variation in their tactics (Presthus 1973).  
 
Methods of Influence, Insiders versus Outsiders 
 
The range of tools and options available to a pressure group seeking to influence public 
policy is extensive, whatever the particular constitutional arrangements. “Relevant decision 
makers can be contacted, media campaigns launched or members can be mobilized to exert 
pressure on politicians” (Binderkrantz 2004, 3). Watts identifies the Executive, the 
legislature, public opinion, and to a lesser extent the courts, as the primary influence levers 
(Watts 2007, 45-57). Sometimes pressure group literature organises these influence 
methods in two broad groupings – direct and indirect (Watts 2007, 45-57). Direct tactics and 
strategies involve contact with, and the attempt to influence, public policy decision makers, 
with a further distinction often made between action focused on bureaucratic players and 
action targeting politicians and political parties. Indirect tactics and strategies, which seek to 
bring about external pressure upon decision makers, can be divided into the use of media 
and the mobilisation of the public (Binderkrantz 2004, 5).  
 
Any pressure group initiative or campaign will involve one, all or a combination of these 
levers. New Zealand’s response to greenhouse gas emissions and its Kyoto Protocol 
obligations is an example of a public policy issue that generated wide-ranging pressure 
group activity – both direct and indirect. Groups both supporting and opposing the 
government’s stance (as well as those with a more nuanced view) engaged directly with 
government officials through formal consultation processes, produced hundreds of select 
committee submissions, met and directly lobbied members of Parliament, party 
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spokespeople and policy leaders. Many of the same groups also engaged in widespread 
media activity, issuing press statements, holding press conferences and providing comment 
to interested journalists. Mobilisation was not such a feature of the final policy phase and 
the introduction of the Emissions Trading Scheme. However, mass tractor convoys and  
protests, along with a supporting petition, are regarded as having contributed significantly to 
the Labour-led government’s decision, in 2003, to abandon a previous plan to introduce a 
research tax on methane emissions – “a fantastic victory for farmers” according to 
Federated Farmers President, Charlie Pedersen (Pedersen 2003). 
 
Some “regard the pursuance of indirect strategies as the fall back option for groups excluded 
from direct access to decision making processes” (Binderkrantz 2005, 6). This contention is 
subject to debate. Others have argued that indirect strategies are not inferior or a second-
best option, but are, instead, strategies for different circumstances or strategies that may 
supplement direct methods (Watts 2007, 35). However, there is general agreement that 
different types of pressure groups tend to utilize a different balance of indirect and direct 
methods. “Insider” groups are more likely to utilize direct methods and “outsider” groups 
are more likely to utilize indirect methods (Watts 2007, 34). As Tenbensel has argued: 
 
Insiders ‘have the ear’ of government – they are typically involved in the formulation of 
policy, they are consulted over any changes that may affect their constituency. Insider status 
brings with it access to information about policy. It also confers a formal role on such groups 
(Tenbensel 2006, 527). 
 
On the other hand, “outsider groups either do not want access or legitimacy or are unable to 
attain such recognition” (Watts 2007, 34). 
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During the 1970s, Cleveland described the largest and most important New Zealand 
pressure groups as “classic examples of semi-institutionalised groups to be found in frequent 
consultation with cabinet ministers and their departments” and observed that “whenever a 
major policy decision has to be made involving the economic and professional fields in which 
these groups are active, they are likely to be almost automatically consulted.” He listed, as 
examples, Federated Farmers, the New Zealand Federation of Labour, The New Zealand 
Employers’ Federation, the New Zealand Manufacturers’ Federation, the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce of New Zealand, the New Zealand Returned Services’ Association, 
the Public Service Association and the Medical Association of New Zealand (Cleveland 1972, 
14). In 2008, Barrie Saunders reflected on how the position of these insider groups had 
changed: 
 
If you go back 30 years, the powers in the land were, not necessarily in this order: the 
Manufacturers Federation, Federated Farmers, the Federation of Labour, plus the producer 
boards. Now they either don’t exist or the power has got dispersed (Scherer 2008). 
 
Few would claim groups such as Federated Farmers or the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) are 
no longer influential. The power of these groups will always be determined by their 
composition. There are still large numbers of farmers and they continue to wield significant 
economic influence. Likewise, while union membership remains down on pre Employment 
Contracts Act10 levels, the CTU still represents hundreds of thousands of employees. So, they 
both remain very important pressure groups.  However, more akin to the United States 
policy environment, MMP was expected to create a competitive environment for external 
influence and agenda setting. “In the future [under MMP], the range of parties and interests 
                                                 
10 The Employment Contracts Act 1991 reduced the legislative backing for unions, strengthened the direct 
relationship between employers and their employees and removed various obstacles to different types of 
employment contracts and working arrangements. According to Andrew Morrison, in 1996, union membership 
had almost halved in the five years following introduction of the Act (Morrison 1996, 7). 
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able to move issues onto the central political arena, and also to veto policy moves, will be 
wider” (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996).  
 
It is important to acknowledge that some of the changes in pressure group numbers and 
behaviour will, to some extent, be the result of variables and trends beyond MMP. It is 
notable that changes have been observed internationally and in countries where there has 
not been any significant structural shift in political structures and institutions. Watts 
observed that “Since the 1960s, there has been an astonishing rate of growth in the 
formation of issue and cause groups, some national, others operating at a grass roots level.” 
He attributes this “proliferation of pressure groups” to several factors, including: growth in 
the extent and scope of governmental activity, the growing complexity of modern life, 
improved communications that have facilitated association and organisation, an increasingly 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, and the emergence of new post-materialist attitudes 
(Watts 2007, 5-6). Although Watts was writing of the United Kingdom, he could just as easily 
have been writing of New Zealand. 
 
Wyn Grant has argued the traditional model – in which insider groups via direct methods 
were “more effective at exerting influence on decision-makers” – has been challenged in the 
United Kingdom, particularly by the rise of NGOs successfully using various methods of 
indirect influence (Grant 2001, 337-348). Binderkrantz has claimed this trend extended 
beyond the United Kingdom:  
 
The insider/outsider debate has attracted most attention among British political scientists, 
but the described trends seem to be mirrored in other European countries. In Denmark … 
researchers have argued that traditional corporatist structures have been under rupture in 
the last decades. Groups traditionally regarded as highly privileged have complained about 
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their exclusion from the central decision making processes, and a wider range of groups are 
now included in governmental hearing processes. Also, the media has gained increased 
importance in the political process as well as in the strategies pursued by interest groups 
(Binderkrantz 2004, 3). 
 
Although it has rarely been the focus of academic work related to MMP, there is some 
discussion of pressure group behaviour in the New Zealand context. There are sections and 
chapters within general political or public policy works that either provide some predictions 
or discuss the place and behaviours of pressure groups in an MMP world (for example, 
Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, Palmer and Palmer 
1997). In addition, there are a couple of Masters papers - one produced just prior to the 
introduction of MMP and one produced during the first term of MMP - dedicated to 
pressure group strategy (Redward 1995, Sellens 1998). These New Zealand works include 
some very important observations, but to build a more comprehensive picture of how 
pressure group strategy is likely to have been impacted by the move from FPP to MMP, and 
the associated fragmentation of decision-making, it is necessary to consider the 
international literature.  
 
Very few liberal democracies within the past fifty years have substantially remodelled their 
constitutions like New Zealand, but there is a significant literature on pressure group 
behaviour within varying constitutional frameworks, particularly the United States and the 
United Kingdom. While this literature lacks specific reference to a transition from one 
constitution to another, it provides an opportunity for comparative analysis and, thereby, for 
drawing conclusions about New Zealand pressure group transition from an FPP constitution 
to an MMP variety.  
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Relationships and Points of Access 
 
Much of the discourse on pressure group behaviour, strategy or tactics concerns 
relationships and points of access. Having relationships, contacts or, at a minimum, the 
ability to gain access are important for the transmission of information, ideas and policy 
arguments. The respective value of these points of access to pressure groups varies 
according to the constitutional framework and distribution of power between the Executive 
and the legislature, and is an influence on pressure group behaviour. “When legislatures gain 
greater power over the passage of statutes – and Cabinet power is thus constrained – the 
configuration of interest group/parliamentary relationships is thereby altered” (Boston, 
Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 155). 
 
Under the FPP constitutional model, it was not just decision-making power that tended to be 
concentrated (in the hands of the Executive), but also pressure group influence. FPP suited 
better connected and better resourced insider groups. This concentration of influence 
amongst key insider groups is not surprising when the fundamentals of FPP decision-making 
are considered. Cabinet was secure and powerful. It did not face any significant decision-
making competition. Consequently, the Cabinet and its composite Ministers were in a 
position to be selective as to which pressure group relationships they kept. They tended to 
keep the important relationships. This resulted in a mutually beneficial and somewhat 
symbiotic relationship that reinforced the position of both the politician and the pressure 
group. It provided the insider pressure groups with access and influence and it provided the 
Minister, Cabinet and government with policy information, endorsement and legitimacy. 
According to Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts: 
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“New Zealand’s majoritarian political system has enhanced the discretion of decision-makers 
as to whom they wish to involve in consultation and negotiation … Cabinet’s unequivocal 
power has meant that it has not had to consult, let alone negotiate, except where the 
government wants to legitimate its action, to gain information, and/or to simply the policy 
implementation process” (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 161). 
 
By comparison, “governments, in systems where authority is divided between different 
branches of government, are unable to enforce interest group unity by talking to only one 
interest group; the Executive cannot control which interest groups shall receive a friendly 
hearing in Congress, or vice versa” (Wilson 1990, 33). In this environment, different parties 
can source information from different groups and different groups can peddle their 
information, ideas and arguments to different parties. There is more of a contest for ideas, 
and, in turn, it is expected pressure groups will develop relationships across the political 
spectrum.  
 
This presumption is supported by Jeffrey Berry’s analysis of pressure group behaviour in the 
United States. Berry concluded that “public interest groups devote significant amounts of 
time to trying to persuade ‘swing’ members of Congress to come over to their side”(Berry 
1977, 222) and that “lobbying opponents, through friendly and unfriendly approaches, was 
found to be a common, not anomalous, trait among public interest groups.” He also found 
that while some members of Congress would be considered “lost causes”, “public interest 
lobbyists do not avoid people in government just because they are unsympathetic” (Berry 
1977, 219). These conclusions probably owe as much to the historical independence of 
members of Congress from their political parties as they do to the strength of Congress as 
constitutionally enshrined. Nevertheless, it is this independence that contributes to an open 
and competitive legislative environment and justifies comparisons with MMP. 
 28
 
It is interesting to compare Berry’s findings with comments by Holtzman about pressure 
group lobbying in the United Kingdom in an FPP environment. Not only does Holtzman 
consider that “the privileges and process of consultation with the Executive act as an 
inhibitor upon interest groups lobbying the Parliament,” but that “interest group leaders are 
reluctant to jeopardize their good relations with the Executive” on the basis that “a lobbying 
campaign in Parliament could undermine the valuable position that the groups have 
achieved in the departments” (Holtzman 1966, 41). A direct and compelling comparison can 
be drawn by looking at the United Kingdom during the period of 1974-79. For the large part 
of this period, the Government lacked a majority, which “encouraged sectional groups to 
make greater use of contacts within Parliament to modify or overturn decisions”(Grant and 
Allan 1989, 68).  
 
Accordingly, when New Zealand adopted MMP, it was anticipated there would be some shift 
in pressure group emphasis from the Executive and its ministers to Parliament and its 
members (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 161). Pressure groups would “need to 
establish contacts with all coalition parties, and in the case of minority governments, may 
need to establish contact with the supporting parties. It may also be a rational strategy to 
lobby the opposition, as there is a chance that Parliament will be more open to private 
members’ bills from the opposition” (Redward 1995, 39).  
 
MMP was also expected to deliver more political parties to Parliament. In doing so it would 
result in both a wider range of political philosophies being represented and some 
philosophies and interests being advocated by multiple parties. For example, since the 
introduction of MMP, the Labour Party has had political competition for the advocacy and 
promotion of labour interests. Notably, the Alliance Party, the Green Party and the 
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Progressive Party have all been strong advocates of collective bargaining. New Zealand First 
was also a consistent advocate for increases in the minimum wage. It can be assumed MMP 
pressure groups would need a wider range of political relationships and access points to be 
effective. 
 
Select Committees 
 
Select committees are a point of access to the policy process for pressure groups wherever 
there is some kind of parliamentary model of government. In New Zealand they are 
primarily concerned with considering submissions and making recommendations in respect 
of legislation referred to them by Parliament, but they also have opportunities to investigate 
broader policy issues and set their own policy agenda. Unlike direct lobbying of politicians, 
public relations campaigns or even engagement with the bureaucracy (with the exception of 
formalised consultation processes), engagement with select committees tends to be more 
formal and structured.  
 
New Zealand’s FPP select committees were regarded by many as relatively ineffectual 
(Malone, 2008). Similarly, their FPP counterparts in the United Kingdom have been 
described as producing “a constant flow of reports which are rarely discussed in Parliament, 
and seldom make a stir … rarely, in practice, do they make much impact on departmental 
policies” (Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson 1976, 141). By comparison, “the importance of 
committees in the Congress [in the US] and in most state legislatures cannot be 
overemphasized” (Holtzman 1966, 62). One of the main reasons for the different levels of 
influence between committees in the United States and those in the United Kingdom (or FPP 
New Zealand) is their relative independence. Select committees are comprised of the 
members of the legislature (in New Zealand’s case, excluding members of the Executive). 
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Under an FPP model, the Parliamentary majority (particularly where that majority is 
substantial) enjoyed by the governing party means that select committees tend to be 
majority-controlled by the government. Consequently, FPP Executives are able to exert 
significant control over both the agendas and recommendations of select committees.  
 
As an extension of MMP’s impact on the composition of Parliament, particularly the 
expected arrival of multiple political parties and minority governments, the composition of 
select committees was expected to change. Government majority-controlled and chaired 
committees were expected to be much less common11 and, correspondingly, the 
government’s ability to control the agenda and recommendations of select committees was 
expected to be diminished. MMP would make select committees “more important to the 
passage of legislation” and increase “the scrutiny of government through select committee 
investigations” (Palmer and Palmer 1997, 15). Consequently, MMP select committees should 
have provided a more fruitful channel of policy engagement and influence for pressure 
groups. 
 
However, unlike Congressional committee members in the United States, members of New 
Zealand select committees are still, first and foremost, members of political parties - and 
there was no compelling expectation they would be any more independent of their party 
under MMP than under FPP.12 Furthermore, select committees themselves are not decision-
making bodies. They are advisory bodies. If the Executive or Parliament ignores their 
recommendations the committees have no recourse. Therefore, it remained uncertain 
whether more diverse party representation on committees and non-majority control would 
                                                 
11 Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts observed that since the 1930s it was “an unheard of situation” for a 
government to be without select committee majorities (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 69). 
12 According to the opinion leader MMP survey undertaken by Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts in 1995, 43% 
of respondents felt party loyalty would be weaker under MMP, while 28% felt it would be stronger and 23% 
expected little change (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 33) 
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translate into greater policy influence. That is, ultimately, what would influence pressure 
group behaviour. 
 
The Bureaucracy 
 
“The best way to influence Ministers is to influence the advice they receive” (Matthews 
1993, 233). That is a strong proposition and the bureaucracy tends to be the Executive’s 
primary advisor. The bureaucracy comprises the many government agencies and officials 
who undertake research and submit advice at the behest of Ministers and Cabinet. The 
bureaucracy works for the Executive. Only occasionally (for instance, when servicing a select 
committee) does it work for Parliament.  
 
The role and influence of the bureaucracy varies country to country. In the United Kingdom, 
Australia, France – countries with relatively strong Executives - it is regarded as strongly 
influential. “If [in the United Kingdom] a group had to choose only one point of access to the 
decision-making arena, it would invariably choose the bureaucratic arena” (Richardson 1993, 
90). By contrast, in the United States “the bureaucracy does not enjoy that favourable 
position which characterizes public administration in Britain and on the continent” 
(Holtzman 1966, 63). This may be partly explained by the American political psyche and the 
inclination of the legislature to be suspicious of the bureaucracy (Holtzman 1966, 3), but it 
may also reflect the greater contestability of policy and fragmentation of power in the 
United States. Without the same ability to control the policy agenda, the United States 
Executive can not afford to rely on one source of information and advice to the same extent 
as its British counterpart, for instance.  
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MMP was expected to subject the bureaucracy to competition and impact upon its relative 
monopoly on advice to the Executive. Interestingly, almost a third of opinion leaders 
surveyed prior to the introduction of MMP believed the influence of senior public servants 
would increase under MMP (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996).13 Boston, Levine, 
Mcleay and Roberts regarded this expectation as “open to doubt”, but nevertheless argued 
that “irrespective of the political complexions of governments under MMP, the role of the 
public service will be as vital as ever” and that it would remain “the principal source of ‘free 
and frank’ advice to Cabinet”. They did acknowledge that under minority governments there 
would be a shift in the balance of power between the Executive and the legislature that 
would affect both the political and bureaucratic arms of the Executive (Boston, Levine, 
Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 147). 
 
In New Zealand, the period since the introduction of MMP has coincided with a trend 
towards the appointment of ‘political advisors’. These advisors, who are independent of the 
bureaucracy, are employed by Ministers to support and advise Ministers directly, 
particularly in relation to the political risk and opportunity implications of public policy 
decisions. This trend may be the result of a change in political management and 
communications practice and not directly related to MMP (for instance, it has occurred in 
the United Kingdom). However, these advisors can play an important role briefing Ministers 
and negotiating policy and legislation with support parties. Prior to the introduction of MMP, 
there was a view that ministerial advisers would further enhance the contestability of advice 
under MMP (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, 18).  
 
                                                 
13 The reasons for senior public servants being expected to enjoy an increased influence under MMP included a 
more frequent turnover of governments and, therefore, ministers, as well as the greater time ministers would 
need to devote to inter-party negotiations at the expense of policy development (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and 
Roberts 1996, 146). 
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Under any constitutional system there will be examples of politicians making public policy 
decisions without, or contrary to, the advice of the bureaucracy, but where politicians, 
Ministers in particular, have less control over the public policy agenda, as was expected 
under MMP (Boston, Levine, Mcleay and Roberts 1996, 156), this should happen more 
frequently. However, as Richardson observed, in considering an influence strategy and the 
role of the bureaucracy within it, pressure groups “do not have to choose just one lobbying 
technique” (Richardson 1993, 90). Consequently, even if MMP did expose the bureaucracy 
to competition in its role as policy advisor, there is no certainty pressure groups will have 
placed any less emphasis on the bureaucracy as an avenue for policy influence under MMP.  
 
Media and Mobilisation 
 
The use of the media and the mobilisation of constituents or the public have always been 
important influence techniques for New Zealand pressure groups. These techniques include 
media releases, media interviews, press conferences, letter writing campaigns, marches, 
petitions and advertising campaigns. They can form a key part of any political influence 
strategy, through creating public awareness of an issue and elevating the sense of political 
risk or opportunity for decision-makers.  MMP was expected to make public policy more 
sensitive to public opinion (Palmer and Palmer 1997, 195). In turn, it could be expected to 
influence the emphasis placed on media and mobilisation by pressure groups. 
 
The literature suggests that stronger Executives should be relatively well positioned and 
more likely to resist public pressure and opposition to the policy agenda, while weaker 
Executives are likely to be more malleable. “Claims about the decline of Parliament and 
concentration of power within Prime Minister, Cabinet and bureaucracy are said to insulate 
policy-making from outside influences” (Stone 1996, 42). As long as FPP governments 
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possess a Parliamentary majority and a secure Executive, which has been the overwhelming 
norm in the UK and New Zealand, they are in a stronger position than an MMP government 
to weather short term public hostility and remain committed to their policy agenda. “The 
stability of British cabinets permits the Government and majority party to plan and carry out 
legislation; in effect, to govern with confidence over the long run” (Holtzman 1966, 41). The 
same applied to New Zealand FPP governments. Although an FPP government still needs to 
manage the risk of rebellion from within the governing party, it does not face the risk of a 
nervous or opportunistic support party deciding to renege on a policy commitment as a 
consequence of public pressure.  
 
Holtzman was sceptical of the value of public relations campaigns in the United Kingdom. 
“Party discipline raises almost impenetrable barriers on important issues of policy, and 
public relations campaigns from the outside are both expensive and questionable in their 
effect” (Holtzman 1966, 42). Historically, party discipline in New Zealand has also been 
strong. In addition, as discussed above, there may also be a concern amongst pressure 
groups dealing with a powerful Executive that undertaking an aggressive lobbying campaign 
across Parliament or undertaking a highly visible public relations campaign will only alienate 
the Executive. It is not just time, resources and prospects of success that are considerations 
for pressure groups. The impact of public relations campaigns on strategic relationships is 
also important. 
 
Finally, on the basis of a shift in decision-making power and the Executive’s diminished 
ability to dictate the policy agenda, MMP was expected to result in greater openness in 
policy-making and more extensive public debate on major issues (Boston, Levine, Mcleay 
and Roberts 1996, 129), again with implications for the influence of public opinion and 
public campaigning.  “The public nature of debate and increased interparty negotiation, in a 
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Coalition cabinet or minority government Parliament, is likely to slow down the process of 
legislating and may increase the extent to which public consultation affects government 
policy” (Palmer and Palmer 1997, 15). 
 
Information 
 
Information is critical to public policy decision-making and fundamental to pressure groups. 
According to John Wright, “interest groups achieve influence through the acquisition and 
strategic transmission of information that legislators need to make good public policy and to 
get reelected”, and “most of what interest groups and lobbyists do involves acquiring expert 
information about policy and politics and reporting this information to legislators” (Wright 
1996, 2). Furthermore, where power is more fragmented, where the policy environment is 
more contestable and where the policy process is longer and subject to more extended 
scrutiny, the value of information should be heightened.  For instance, it has been observed 
that in the United States during the period from the 1970s to the 1990s “a divided 
government – with neither the Republican nor Democrats controlling both the White House 
and the Congress … fuelled demand for intellectual ammunition on both sides” (Stone, 1996, 
40).    
 
The role of information was not a major theme within academic discussions of policy and 
pressure groups under MMP.  However, it was an issue addressed by Palmer and Palmer, 
and their view supports the suggestion information would be increasingly important: 
 
Perhaps the most effective weapon of the pressure group in an MMP environment is to 
provide all the relevant decision-makers with information about how a decision will affect 
people and to make rational arguments, based on that information as to why any policy 
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should or should not be adopted” and “despite the confidential nature of the decision-
making process, most arguments in favour of a policy need, finally, to withstand the scrutiny 
of a public gaze (Palmer and Palmer 1997, 199). 
 
Interestingly, during the early stages of New Zealand’s MMP experience, Executive Director 
of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, Roger Kerr (himself a critic of MMP) noted that 
counter to some predictions, “old-style, sectional lobbying” had by and large not returned 
under MMP. Instead, he argued “that long-term success in the public policy debate 
nowadays is about sound research and advocacy, not about visits to the Beehive or deal 
making behind closed doors” (Kerr 1998) - although he attributed this to factors other than 
MMP.14 
 
Another consideration in relation to the role of information is that MMP policy was likely to 
be increasingly conceived and shaped by parties and politicians without access to the advice 
and information of government officials. Not only were government support parties 
expected to have an influence over policy and legislation through negotiations with the 
government, but even opposition parties would have an opportunity to shape policy through 
private members’ bills. Without those parties having access to a bureaucracy to provide the 
research and legislative drafting, there would be an information gap for pressure groups to 
exploit under MMP. 
 
Presthus made an insightful distinction between two types of information used by pressure 
groups, “substantive” and “ideological”. Thus far, discussion has focused on the use of the 
former, “the objective, technical, feasibility components of a policy issue,” rather than the 
                                                 
14 “New Zealand has learned some hard lessons about the consequences of special interest politics, 
and that electoral systems are not the only factors that determine a country’s direction. Ultimately, 
other factors, such as the general climate of ideas, the realities of international competition, and the 
practical experiences of citizens count for more” (Kerr 1998). 
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latter, which relates to “party and political survival”. In any constitutional environment, both 
substantive and ideological information and arguments are critical tools of pressure group 
activity and engagement as both can deliver the necessary rationale for a policy decision 
(Presthus 1973, 82). Similar observations have been made in the New Zealand context. 
“Lobbyists may make clear and logical policy arguments based on solid information. Or they 
may engage in political threats or inducements. In the latter case, they may resemble 
politicians rather than advocates. Express or implied threats are a sort of political 
bargaining” (Palmer and Palmer 2004, 241). 
 
There is experience and academic opinion to suggest the use of “ideological” information 
would be of greater value and importance to pressure groups under MMP. Wilson has 
argued that “when Executives are weaker, the overtly political tactics of interest groups are 
more important” and that “most American interest groups are more obviously involved in 
politics than their counterparts in countries with strong Executives” (Wilson 1990, 21). It was 
certainly anticipated that MMP would create opportunities for New Zealand pressure groups 
to “take advantage of tensions between coalition partners to attempt to influence the 
legislative programme” (Redward 1995, p38).  
 
This suggests the need for pressure groups to demonstrate a level of political awareness, 
sophistication and even gamesmanship in order to be successful in an MMP environment.  
They would need to understand the perspectives of different parties and the reality of the 
compromises that are a part of the public policy process. Indeed, Palmer believed pressure 
groups would need to be quite sophisticated in the way they presented and organised their 
information if they were to advance their interests in the complex, multi-party, multi-
philosophy MMP environment. As he commented in an interview in 2002: 
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Pressure groups are going to be more influential and … they are going to be more influential 
in the policy-making process. But how influential will not depend so much on their political 
clout as on their policy-making sophistication; their ability to craft policy changes that are 
acceptable to a Parliament which is broadly representative of the public, and not peddle 
their own particular interests ahead of those. If they can subordinate their private interests 
for a wider set of interests, pressure groups are likely to be much more effective in the 
policy-making process than they are now (Palmer and Hill 2002, 114). 
 
Five Hypotheses for Examination 
 
MMP was expected to change New Zealand’s political power and decision-making 
structures. Consequently, it was anticipated there would be changes to the environment in 
which pressure groups operate, to the relative value of different influence channels and 
techniques and, in turn, changes to the behaviour of pressure groups themselves. In addition 
to the expectations of New Zealand commentators and academics, there are assumptions 
that can be drawn about pressure group behaviour under MMP from the observation of 
pressure groups in democracies with stronger legislatures and more fragmented power 
structures.  
 
Based on this collective observation and expectation, five hypotheses relating to pressure 
group influence and behaviour are set out below. These hypotheses are organised around 
the different channels and methods of pressure group influence discussed above. 
 
The first hypothesis is that, on account of the wider distribution of decision-making power 
under MMP than FPP, pressure groups would develop a range of political and Parliamentary 
relationships and would be increasingly prepared to engage with politicians and political 
parties across the political spectrum.  
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The second hypothesis is that, on account of their more diverse composition, fewer 
government chairs and a much reduced likelihood of government-majority membership, 
select committees would become a more valuable channel of engagement and policy 
influence for pressure groups than they had been under FPP. 
 
The third hypothesis is that, on account of the increased policy influence of Parliament and 
the increased influence of political parties not represented within the Executive (therefore, 
without any direct relationship with the bureaucracy), the bureaucracy would be a less 
important channel of policy influence for pressure groups under MMP. Pressure groups 
would, in fact, find themselves increasingly in competition with the bureaucracy as providers 
of advice and information. 
 
The fourth hypothesis is that, on account of public policy under MMP being increasingly 
sensitive to public opinion and on account of a lesser risk associated with alienating a less 
powerful Executive, media and public/constituency mobilisation techniques would be more 
successful and more popular tools of pressure group influence under MMP than FPP. 
 
The fifth hypothesis is that, on account of the greater contestability of policy and a longer, 
more consultative policy process under MMP than FPP, information would be an 
increasingly valuable resource for pressure groups – although the most effective use of that 
information will require a more sophisticated ability to tailor information and policy 
arguments according to a more complex political environment. 
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Chapter 3 –The Structural Context for MMP Pressure Groups 
 
Real but Variable Fragmentation of Power 
 
All of the expected changes in pressure group behaviour and the hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 2 were derived from assumed structural shifts in the distribution of decision-making 
power. MMP was expected to fragment that power, thereby creating a more contestable 
policy environment and, in turn, resulting in increased lobbying of Parliament and 
engagement with select committees. The assumption of a shift in decision-making power is 
fundamental. Consequently, before entering into any analysis of pressure group behaviour 
under MMP and attempting to assess expectations versus the experience, it is necessary to 
have confidence the preconditions for expected change have been present. 
 
There can be no disputing MMP has delivered real structural change to the balance of power 
between Parliament and the Executive.  The figures and facts are compelling. Each MMP 
Parliament has comprised at least six political parties, while no more than three parties were 
elected to Parliament in any FPP national election between 1938 and 1990.15 No single 
political party has held an elected Parliamentary majority under MMP, while every national 
election under FPP between 1935 and 1993 delivered a single party Parliamentary majority.   
 
Comparative calculations of the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP)16, as set 
out below in Table 1, illustrate a significant shift in the structure of Parliamentary power 
                                                 
15 Four parties, National, Labour, the Alliance and New Zealand First, were elected to Parliament in 1993 and by 
1996, the number of parties represented in the House had grown to eight, as parties, factions and individual 
politicians positioned themselves for the first MMP election. 
16 The ENPP is a commonly used political science tool for comparing the number of parties in different political 
systems, adjusted for their relative Parliamentary strength or, more specifically, their relative share of the 
Parliamentary vote. A higher ENPP indicates a greater distribution of power across the parties represented in 
Parliament. 
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after the introduction of MMP for the 1996 election. New Zealand’s ENPP was at its highest 
following the 1996 and 2002 general elections, while the 2008 election delivered the lowest 
ENPP since the introduction of MMP. 
 
Table 1 – New Zealand’s Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (1946 – 2008) 
Election Year ENPP 
1946 – 1990 1.95 (average)17 
1996 3.7618 
1999 3.44 
2002 3.76 
2005 2.98 
2008 2.7819 
 
MMP also resulted in very substantial changes to the composition and balance of power of 
Parliamentary select committees. Government majorities were the overwhelming norm on 
select committees under FPP. By comparison, Malone found that of the 51 subject select 
committees appointed at the commencement of each of the first four MMP governments (in 
1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005), only two committees had a majority of government members20 
(Malone 2008, 150).21 
                                                 
17 Source for 1946-1990 data: Lijphart, Arend. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven 
Democracies, 1945-1990. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p 162. 
18 Source for 1996-2005 data: Levine, Stephen, Nigel Roberts and Rob Salmond.’ A Wider View: MMP Ten Years 
On’ in Stephen Levine and Nigel Roberts, eds., The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005 
(Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2007), p. 456. 
19 Source for 2008 data: Calculations based on data in Chief Electoral Office, The General Election 2008 
(Wellington: Chief Electoral Office, Ministry of Justice, 2008), p 3. 
20 For the purposes of this analysis government MPs are defined as MPs belonging to Parliamentary parties 
represented within the Executive. Significantly, it does not include those MPs belonging to parties that were 
allocated Ministerial portfolios outside the Executive. For instance, it does not include a New Zealand First MP 
during the 2005-2008 term of government and it does not include ACT or Maori Party MPs during the current 
term. This is a reasonable definition given these MPs do not have party members represented at the Cabinet 
table and their parties are unlikely to be committed to support all government legislation. However, it is 
important to recognise that parties with Ministerial portfolios are likely to have a much closer working 
relationship with the government than traditional “Opposition” parties. So, while strictly speaking, it is accurate 
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Table 2 – Balance of power on subject select committees in MMP Parliaments22  
 
Election Year Government 
Majorities 
Split 
Committees 
Government 
Minorities 
1996 0 12 0 
1999 1 10 2 
2002 1 2 10 
2005 0 3 10 
200923 5 2 6 
 
These structural changes to the distribution of power have had a direct influence on the 
policy, decision-making and legislative processes. This has been widely observed by New 
Zealand political academics and commentators (Martin 2004, Shaw and Eichbaum 2008), but 
it is Malone’s extensive comparative analysis of lawmaking under MMP versus FPP that is 
most comprehensive and compelling. He found that MMP had placed considerable 
constraints on a government’s control of legislation and resulted in a need for substantial 
compromise and inter-party negotiation “unthinkable” under FPP (Malone 2008).  
                                                                                                                                            
to state the Executive has only controlled seven subject select committees since the introduction of MMP, 
through the government’s relationships with other parties represented across the various Ministerial portfolios 
(likely to be those parties that have agreed to provide the government, at a minimum, with “supply and 
confidence” support) it should be able to exercise a degree of influence over a greater number of select 
committee outcomes than the bare “government majority” numbers suggest. The definition of majorities and 
minorities has become somewhat blurred under MMP. 
21 While the first National-New Zealand First government was a majority coalition government, “the allocation of 
committee seats to both coalition parties was such that the government did not hold a majority on any of the 
subject committees.” Rather, all 12 committees were evenly split between government and non-government 
MPs (Malone 2008, 150) 
22 This table (for the election years 1996 – 2005) is taken from the data and table compiled by Malone (Malone 
2008, 152). ‘Subject’ select committees are primarily concerned with the scrutiny of policy and legislation. They 
exclude both those select committees (Business, Officers of Parliament, Privileges and Standing Orders) primarily 
concerned with the operation and rules of Parliament and the Regulations Review committee. Also excluded are 
temporary committees brought together for the consideration of single, one-off issues. 
23 This select committee data was collected in October 2009. It was not included in Malone’s original table or 
analysis. 
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In regard to the government’s choice and control of bills for introduction to the House, 
Malone found “the formation of coalition governments under MMP has provided parties 
with a greater capacity to bind, or prevent, governments from introducing bills”, that MMP 
“has resulted in a noticeable reduction in Executive control as to which bills a government 
introduces into the House” (Malone 2008, 83) and that “political realities dictate that failure 
to ensure even a basic level of commitment to a bill among coalition parties and the 
requisite non-government parties before drafting is to risk committing time and resources to 
a proposal that a majority of the House is unwilling to support. This is a vastly different 
world to that in which FPP Ministers operated” (Malone 2008, 130). 
 
This is consistent with Paul Swain’s reflection that one of the most common and important 
inquiries made of Labour Ministers by Prime Minister, Helen Clark, was whether they “have 
the numbers?” (Swain 2008). Furthermore, once a bill has entered the House under MMP, 
select committees have become more influential, which has been reflected in Ministers 
needing to “work harder and be more flexible as to the content of their bills in order to 
secure something approaching the level of control Ministers enjoyed in relation to select 
committees under FPP” (Malone, 2008, p168). Changes to a bill at the final third reading 
stage were influenced by “the leverage that a non-government party enjoys when 
negotiating with the government”, and “inter-party negotiation can result in the 
government having to support non-government amendments to ensure the progress of its 
legislation” (Malone 2008, 198-199). 
 
Malone’s analysis and conclusions are broadly consistent with the views of the politicians, 
public law specialists, government relations consultants and pressure group leaders 
interviewed during the interview phase of this thesis. For example, Swain described MMP as 
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having had “an enormous impact” on public policy decision-making through its distribution 
of power across Parliament and away from the Executive (Swain 2008) and Tim Clarke 
claimed “the breakdown of the Executive dominance of Parliament is real and tangible” 
(Clarke 2008).  
 
Significantly, the predominant opinion is that these changes in governing structures and 
related changes to the decision-making process have had real implications for pressure 
groups. For instance, Clarke argued “there is now a greater capacity for public and private 
sector interest groups to affect and impact that [decision-making] process than there was in 
the past” (Clarke 2009). Nevertheless, there are risks in assuming this structural change will 
have necessarily translated into significant behavioural change on the part of pressure 
groups. When Sellens reviewed MMP pressure group strategy in 1998, she concluded that 
“in general, the changes have been modest rather than dramatic. The tactics and strategies 
are similar, the way select committees are lobbied is similar, the financial and human 
resources expended on lobbying is similar and the estimated influence of lobbyists is similar” 
(Sellens 1998, 43). 
 
First, and very importantly, although structural change has been real, it has also been 
variable.  The research and interview phase of this thesis coincided with the 2008 election, 
the period of transition from the Labour-led to National-led government and the first six 
months of that new regime. This timing was significant. It introduced another variation on 
MMP government, provided a reminder that no two MMP governments are the same and 
tempered any inclination to draw firm conclusions about the characteristics of MMP or 
pressure group behaviour based on only one (or a few) MMP government. The redistribution 
of power from the Executive to Parliament has varied from government to government, 
Parliament to Parliament, since the first MMP election in 1996. Swain commented that this 
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redistribution was “a bit faltering and stuttering at the start” (Swain 2008) and Mai Chen has 
drawn a sharp comparison between the 2008 elected National-led government and previous 
MMP governments, particularly the 2005-2008 Labour-led government:  
 
Last year’s election delivered a shift of power in Parliament such that the new Government’s 
Cabinet and caucus, together with the caucuses of the support parties, are now closer to 
exercising the kind of “elective dictatorship” that was a feature of first-past-the-post 
governments. It reverses in part the dispersion of power away from the Executive to 
Parliament that was a feature of earlier MMP governments.  
 
Chen also noted that during the last term (2005-2008) the “Labour-led government faced a 
set of select committees with an unprecedented degree of independence, and was forced to 
rely on the goodwill of minor parties to patch up legislation. This term the National Party has 
an outright majority on five significant select committees and with the help of just one 
support party MP from either its political left or right, also controls a further four. The result 
is that in nearly every area, the Government can control the agenda” (Chen 2009).  
 
Table 2 (above) reinforces Chen’s comments.  Having secured more MPs in the 2008 election 
than any other party under MMP, in September 2009 the National Party held a majority of 
members on five subject select committees, more than twice the total number of select 
committee majorities enjoyed by the four preceding MMP governments.24 
 
The focus of this thesis is pressure groups and it does not attempt a comprehensive analysis 
of the variable governing arrangements and governments experienced in New Zealand since 
1996. However, in order to provide a picture of the variable political context in which 
                                                 
24 These five committees were Government and Administration, Justice and Electoral, Health, Social Services and 
Transport and Industrial Relations (October 2009). 
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pressure groups have operated during that time it is necessary to provide some 
comparisons. New Zealand’s first MMP government, the National-New Zealand First 
coalition of 1996-1998, was a two-party majority coalition. New Zealand First and National 
shared the Cabinet and between just the two parties controlled a majority in Parliament. 
Consequently, policy negotiation and discussion was still largely addressed within Cabinet 
and within the Executive. At least until the coalition splintered in 1998, the Executive 
dominance that was characteristic of FPP had, to a large extent, continued. MMP had 
impacted on other features of policy-making, notably via the post-election negotiation 
process. It had also introduced a two party leader dynamic to the Cabinet table. Yet, in its 
first couple of years, MMP had not significantly diluted Executive power. According to 
Sellens, in 1998: 
 
The fact there was a majority government meant that the opposition parties had little 
influence over policy and legislation. This is likely to have affected the way lobbyists 
approached opposition parties. The findings of the research are likely to have been different 
if undertaken later in the year, when the government had a minority (Sellens 1998, 44). 
 
By contrast, the 2005-2008 Labour-led government involved two parties, Labour and The 
Progressive Party, at the Cabinet table. Two others, New Zealand First and United Future, 
held Executive powers and Ministerial posts (but outside Cabinet) and the Green Party had 
policy responsibilities (but no Cabinet or Ministerial authority). The Executive did not control 
a majority in Parliament (except for the commitments it had secured for votes on confidence 
or supply)25 and each piece of legislation was progressed on a case by case basis with 
support needing to be secured from at least two Parliamentary parties outside the 
Executive. “The last term [2005-2008] was particularly fluid” (Norman 2008).  
                                                 
25 In the case of the Green Party, its support actually took the form of a commitment to abstain (and not to vote 
against) the government on confidence and supply votes. 
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The current National-led government is different again. Following a strong election 
performance, the National Party has 58 seats in Parliament (the most secured by any party 
under MMP). The National Party secured 45 per cent of the party vote in the 2008 election, 
11 per cent more than its closest rival, the Labour Party. This was the highest percentage 
won by any party since the introduction of MMP. While it  is still a minority government, the 
National Party has supply and confidence agreements with three parties (ACT, United Future 
and the Maori Party), a Memorandum of Understanding with the Green Party, and requires 
only four additional votes (from outside its own party ranks) to pass legislation. 
Consequently, it probably enjoys more control over the policy process than all but New 
Zealand’s first MMP government.  
 
Chen argued that the relative strength of the current National government’s position was 
reflected in the substantive legislation it rapidly introduced and passed in the first phase of 
its term (for example, law and order legislation, Resource Management Act changes, 
Auckland governance legislation) (Chen 2009). As the National government’s first term 
continued it began to encounter its own challenges in building majority support for key 
legislation, notably its revised Emissions Trading Scheme (Small 2009). 
 
A Shift in Political Culture 
 
In addition to the high degree of variability in the balance of power between Parliament and 
the Executive, MMP has resulted in wide-ranging and, often, unanticipated governing 
structures and arrangements, as observed by Chen: 
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Sixteen years after its introduction in 1993, the political parties have learned to operate 
under MMP, and have developed new constitutional conventions and practices as recorded 
in the Cabinet Manual. Our political culture has adjusted to the “agree to disagree” 
provisions, the different configurations of support, and novel approaches to the distribution 
of ministerial portfolios that allow mostly minority coalition governments to govern (Chen 
2009).  
 
Ministers outside Cabinet (including a Minister of Foreign Affairs), the 2009 Memorandum of 
Understanding between the National and Green parties and the granting of selected policy 
responsibilities to parties and MPs outside the Executive (for example, the Labour-led 
government’s decision to grant responsibility for the KiwiMade campaign to the Green 
Party) are all examples of the new approaches taken and arrangements reached between 
parties that have taken MMP government into territory not widely anticipated.  
 
It is apparent these arrangements may not simply be a function of electoral outcomes, 
negotiations, personalities and the politics of the day. They also reflect a pattern,  a learning 
and evolution in our political culture (Chen 2009). Current Prime Minister John Key has cited 
the inclusion of the Maori Party within the current government bloc and the National Party’s 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Green Party as signs of the further “maturing” of 
MMP (Wilson 2009). There has been a growing tendency for minor parties to enter into 
relatively flexible, non-committal working relationships of different forms with the major 
governing parties. This appears to reflect an increased willingness to address the politics of 
Parliament on an issue by issue basis and to work with whichever party necessary in respect 
to any individual issue. It seems structural change has precipitated a cultural or attitudinal 
political change – and that is a significant feature of the environment within which pressure 
groups now operate. 
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Non-Legislative Tools of Government 
 
The focus of much of the expectation and analysis of the impact of MMP has been on 
legislation, including the work of Malone. It needs to be recognised that governments wield 
other instruments for influencing policy – notably government spending.  The government’s 
budget does require approval by Parliament on an annual basis. Consequently, the passage 
of the Budget will depend on a government’s ability to negotiate either a coalition 
agreement or ‘supply and confidence’ from support parties. As far as the Budget is 
contingent on the deals made to secure its passage, government spending is influenced by 
MMP’s redistribution of power between the Executive and Parliament. Furthermore, 
support parties, particularly coalition partners, have the ability to challenge or raise 
spending proposals with Ministers at any stage – even to make legislative support 
conditional on a particular funding commitment. The need to maintain a working 
relationship or to ensure future support for other budgets or legislation is a consideration 
for any Minister or government.   
 
Nevertheless, the Executive still wields overall control and discretion over departmental 
budgets and the influence of MMP on government spending has not been as direct as upon 
the legislative process. There are numerous opportunities for governments to substantially 
shift public policy through spending decisions without the need to navigate Parliament. 
Transport policy is a good example. The 2008-elected National-led government’s Transport 
Minister, Steven Joyce, re-focused the approximate $3 billion annual National Land 
Transport Fund (NLTF) on road building and maintenance, reducing the previous 
government’s planned spending on public transport, coastal shipping, walking, cycling and 
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road safety. The funding re-focus represented an additional $1 billion in annual investment 
in state highways (Joyce 2009). 
 
There are a range of other tools through which MMP governments can influence public 
policy without recourse to Parliament – for instance, by re-organising the bureaucracy, by 
re-programming departmental priorities or by making appointments to public agency boards 
and advisory groups. In May 2009, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, exercised his 
Executive authority to remove NZAID’s “semi-autonomous status within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade”, focus NZAID on “sustainable economic growth” (as opposed to 
poverty relief) and align aid with New Zealand’s “wider foreign policy interests” (McCully 
2009). This was regarded as a substantial policy change by a number of political 
commentators and aid agencies (Espiner 2009[a]).  
 
The Executive also wields delegated authority to administer secondary legislation (e.g. 
Regulations). While secondary legislation is not intended to materially influence “policy” and 
is subject to Parliamentary oversight via the Regulations Review Select Committee, the 
reality is that substantive policy is, at times, dealt with via Regulations for reasons of 
practicality and, in some cases, expediency.26 In some instances, pressure groups have 
achieved significant public policy change by lobbying for government action that does not 
require primary legislation – and does not involve the challenge of navigating a controversial 
bill through an MMP Parliament. In 2009, the Road Transport Forum’s advocacy of an 
amendment to the Land Transport Rules27, to permit trucks to carry heavier maximum loads 
on designated routes, is one example (Dearnaley 2009). 
 
                                                 
26 For instance, In March 2008, the Minister of Finance, Hon Michael Cullen, introduced, via regulation, a 
controversial change to the criteria against which applications for substantial foreign investments in New Zealand 
are evaluated and approved under the Overseas Investment Act.  
27 Draft Land Transport Rule: Vehicle Dimensions and Mass Amendment [(No 2) 2009] Rule 41001/5.  
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The variability in the relative power of the Executive and Parliament under MMP, and the 
shift in political culture that has resulted from MMP along with the government’s ability to 
utilise non-legislative instruments to deliver policy, provide a more comprehensive context 
for evaluating the extent and nature of pressure group behaviour change under MMP. The 
next chapter sets out the methodology and case studies used for that evaluation. 
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Chapter 4 – Interviews and Case Studies 
 
A Qualitative Research Methodology 
 
Analysing pressure group behaviour is a challenging prospect. First, it is difficult to draw 
clear lines and distinctions between different types of behaviour. Second, some pressure 
group activity and lobbying occurs behind the scenes. Third, it is difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of pressure groups and their different strategies because campaigns are often 
multi-dimensional, with several influence tools being applied at the same time, and because 
public policy outcomes are invariably the result of a myriad of factors and considerations, 
some of which are independent of pressure groups. Policy outcomes can be likened to 
“complex events” as described by Lecce and Francis, which are determined through the 
interactions of actors “who represent larger units – e.g. nations, parties, associations” (Lecce 
and Francis, 189). 
 
Given this complexity, it was considered that a quantitative methodology was likely to be 
too difficult to design and not sufficiently sophisticated to make the distinctions or extract 
the behavioural and strategic insights necessary to meet the thesis’ objectives. Instead, a 
qualitative methodology was preferred, although it has been supported by relevant data and 
statistics as available. The qualitative research consisted of two main components – expert 
interviews and public policy case studies. 
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Expert Interviews 
 
The first component of the research was expert or “elite” interviews. Although direct 
observation is arguably the optimal methodology for researching complex events, it is 
recognised that challenges of “accessibility and temporality” may require a researcher “to 
rely on the self-reports and recollections of the actors or the reports of other observers” 
(Lecce and Francis, 189). The political nature of policy-decision making and pressure group 
influence does not allow for direct observation by researchers, and that is one of the reasons 
expert interviews were undertaken.  
 
A second rationale for the use of expert interviews was the need for the flexibility to explore 
key issues, potentially unanticipated, and to build a picture of decision-making dynamics, 
including the role and influence of different processes and institutions – as opposed to 
seeking views on decision-making processes that are already fully understood. As Johnson 
and Joslyn observed, elite interviews differ substantially from highly structured, 
standardised survey research methods and “a researcher is usually especially interested in 
an elite interviewee’s own interpretation of events or issues and does not want to lose the 
valuable information that an elite “insider” may possess by unduly constraining responses” 
(Johnson and Joslyn 1995, 262). 
 
Ten politicians, pressure group leaders, consulting lobbyists and public policy experts were 
interviewed. There is inevitably some research risk related to the use of an elite interview 
methodology. Notably, there is legitimate concern that the sample selection can result in a 
bias that can limit the ability to generalise the findings. To mitigate this risk, the selection of 
interviewees was intended to provide a range of perspectives from those involved in shaping 
and influencing public policy from within and outside government – those who had made 
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public policy decisions and those who had sought to influence them, those who had lobbied, 
those who had been lobbied, those who had made select committee submissions, those 
who had received and considered them. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
general experiences and understanding of MMP and the public policy process, but in some 
cases their experience or involvement with certain legislative processes or policy decisions 
was also a consideration. 
 
Those interviewed included: Paul Swain (former Labour Party Cabinet Minister); Russel 
Norman (Green Party co-leader); Tony Friedlander (Chief Executive of the Road Transport 
Forum and former National Party Cabinet Minister); Peter Conway (Secretary of the Council 
of Trade Unions); Charles Chauvel (Labour Party MP and former Chair of the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee); Barrie Saunders (Managing Director of Saunders Unsworth); 
Tim Clarke (Public Law Partner, Russell McVeagh); Doug Bailey (Public Law Consultant, 
Russell McVeagh); Sue Kedgley (Green Party MP); Matthew Hooton (former National Party 
advisor, political commentator and Managing Director of Exceltium Public and Corporate 
Affairs Consultancy). Brief biographies can be found in Appendix B.  
 
First, the interviews were intended to elicit the experts’ general views on how the public 
policy process and pressure group behaviour had changed under MMP. Subsequently, the 
interviews tested whether or not – and the extent to which – expected pressure group 
behaviours and the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 had been borne out. Finally, the 
interviews explored specific public policy case studies and experiences. A copy of the 
interview template is attached as Appendix A. 
 
As a supplement to the interviews, a second literature review was also undertaken. The 
objective was to identify any recent New Zealand academic literature or expert comment on 
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how MMP had changed the public policy process, pressure group behaviour or any relevant 
discussion of the thesis’ key public policy case studies. There were a number of relatively 
recent academic works or commentaries that were valuable in underpinning (or in some 
cases forcing a reconsideration of) the opinions and observations expressed by experts. Ryan 
Malone’s comprehensive analysis of legislation under MMP (Malone 2008), Shaw and 
Eichbaum’s work on public policy outcomes in New Zealand (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008) and 
Palmer and Palmer’s revised and updated (4th edition) Bridled Power (Palmer and Palmer 
2004) provided especially important analytical background and analysis of the public policy 
and institutional changes experienced under MMP. Work and commentaries by Martin 
(Martin 2004), Chen (Chen 2009), Levine and Roberts (Levine and Roberts 2004) were also 
helpful. 
 
Public Policy Case Studies 
 
Case studies were the second component of the research and supported the interviews 
through providing a detailed examination of selected public policy decisions. Case studies 
tend to allow a researcher to develop a detailed contextual understanding of a subject or an 
event. The intention of the analysis (in conjunction with expert interviews) was to 
understand how pressure groups had engaged in the policy process – for instance, who had 
lobbied and how, what external pressure they had applied, what role the select committee 
had played and how final decisions had been negotiated and agreed.  
 
The sources researched varied from case study to case study, but included a combination of 
Parliamentary debates (Hansard), select committee submissions, select committee reports, 
Cabinet papers, departmental advice, correspondence, reports and consultation documents, 
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media statements, newspaper and magazine articles and commentaries, political party and 
pressure group websites.  
 
Case study methodologies often involve a risk related to selection. As per elite interviews, 
sample selection can also have a significant influence on findings and conclusions drawn 
from case studies, and the legitimacy of generalisations based on those conclusions. 
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that the case studies considered in this thesis 
were selected on the basis that, at face value, they appeared to be illustrative of the types of 
outcomes possible under MMP, but unlikely under FPP. For instance, the Taxation Bill was 
subject to amendments contrary to the stated view of Ministers, and the Therapeutic 
Products and Medicines Bill was a government bill that had to be withdrawn due to lack of 
Parliamentary support. In addition, they are only a small sample of all the legislation and 
policy legislation effected under MMP. The average annual number of bills enacted during 
the first 10 years of MMP (1997-2006) was 107 (Malone 2008, 202). 
 
On the other hand, it was simply impossible to review all public policy decisions. 
Furthermore, information and opinion on the selected case studies was accessible. This is 
not always the case. The key decision-making factors and influences in respect to many 
public policy decisions are obscure or hidden. 
 
Furthermore, the case studies should not be considered in isolation. Through combining the 
case studies with the expert interviews, reinforced by relevant academic works, 
commentaries, data and statistics, the thesis’ research methodology was intended to be 
pragmatic, multi-dimensional and sufficiently robust to test hypotheses and reach 
conclusions with confidence. 
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While a host of public policy examples are referenced in this thesis, there are four case 
studies that received particular investigation and are most frequently cited. Three of these 
case studies had been identified at an early stage of the research (the Emissions Trading 
Scheme, the Taxation Bill and the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill), while one was 
investigated following its identification during the expert interviews (the Waste 
Minimisation Bill). Consequently, an outline of these four case studies has been provided 
below. These outlines are not intended to provide detailed analysis of pressure group 
behaviour the decision-making process. Most of this analysis is undertaken subsequently, 
when the case studies, expert interviews and supporting research is drawn together in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The purpose of these outlines is to ensure familiarity with the case studies 
and sufficient context for later analysis.  
 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was a major, far-reaching public policy. The purpose of 
the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preferences) Bill was to apply a price 
to carbon within the New Zealand economy by introducing the ETS, and thereby meet New 
Zealand’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.   Its enactment was regarded by supporters 
as critical to New Zealand’s response to global climate change, while its costs were expected 
to be felt across almost every section of the economy, prompting extensive media activity, 
policy engagement and lobbying on the part of many different pressure groups and 
interests.  
 
Two of the affected sectors were forestry and fishing, but in very different respects. As with 
most industries, the introduction of the ETS was expected to add to the cost of running a 
fishing business, and as with other export industries, these costs were expected to have a 
 58
negative impact on the New Zealand fishing industry’s international competitiveness. 
Forestry, on the other hand, given the carbon absorbing qualities of wood, was concerned as 
to whether, under the ETS, carbon credits would be retained by the government or devolved 
to forest owners. In both cases, the industries argued the stakes were high.  Both industries 
would enjoy some success in having their positions reflected in the final policy and 
legislation, but they would follow very different paths and achieve their objectives at 
different stages of the policy process.  
 
Policy Background 
 
Different policy options for responding to the Kyoto Protocol obligations and international 
concerns about carbon emissions and climate change had been discussed and debated in 
New Zealand for a number of years, as they had been around the world. It was a multi-
layered and controversial debate. At the highest level there had been an ongoing dispute 
about the science of climate change and the need for any pricing of carbon at all. At another 
level, there had been arguments as to the best mechanism for pricing carbon and the merits 
of a carbon tax versus a market-based emissions trading scheme.  
 
In addition, there was a myriad of sector-specific debates about the impact of carbon pricing 
upon international competitiveness and, in turn, the appropriate level and duration of 
government shelter from these costs and impacts for various industries.  Going back at least 
a decade, there had also been ongoing policy discussion and consideration as to whether or 
not, and the extent to which, carbon credits should be devolved to forest owners and or 
retained by the Crown. It was within this complex policy context that the detailed policy 
design, consultation and legislative phases of the ETS took place under the 2005-2008 
Labour-led government.  
 59
 
The Politics of the ETS 
 
Given the scientific debate, the international nature of the Kyoto Protocol and emissions, 
the total population and total economy scope of carbon pricing, as well as the perceived 
scale of the risks and issues at stake, the ETS was a highly political topic. Furthermore, the 
legislative phase of the ETS coincided with an election year (2008). On one hand, the ETS 
was strongly supported by the Green Party and a wide range of environmental advocates 
and pressure groups. Conversely, it was strongly opposed by ACT and major industry groups 
concerned about the impact on competitiveness. The positions taken by other political 
parties and pressure groups tended to be more nuanced.  
 
2007 was the year during which ETS policy began to take clear shape. It was the year during 
which the Labour-led government announced the essential framework of the ETS and first 
introduced the Climate Change Bill to Parliament. It was also a year characterised by a 
relative political consensus around the merits of an ETS: 
 
It appears that the Government has a good level of cross-party support for the announced 
plans.  Although the Greens are not happy about the long phasing-in period and, in 
particular, the delayed introduction for the primary sector, overall they support the ETS 
design.  National has also come out in support of the package …(Russell McVeagh 2007). 
 
However, this ETS consensus did not last. As the ETS entered its legislative phase in 2008 and 
greater policy detail emerged, as the economy slowed, as industry pressure groups 
increased their lobbying and public activity and as the 2008 election drew closer, political 
support for the ETS weakened. Most significantly, the National Party withdrew its hitherto 
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support for the ETS in the form proposed by the Labour-led government in May 2008, 
leaving the fate of the ETS in the hands of New Zealand First and the Green Party.  When 
National Party leader, John Key, announced this withdrawal of support, he argued: 
 
Labour has been racing towards a political deadline - the 2008 election - and has been 
prepared to cut corners to get there … National is not prepared to cut those corners - not 
when the financial security of Kiwis is at risk, and not when getting this wrong means 
exporting jobs, ratcheting up inflation, and viciously squeezing household budgets … We 
believe that the current rushed timetable for the design of the ETS and the Select Committee 
process is reckless, given the importance of the issue.  Therefore, I'm calling for a delay in the 
passage of this legislation (Key 2008).  
 
The Climate Change Bill was subject to significant changes during the course of its passage 
through Parliament – the result of changing public attitudes and heightened cost of living 
concerns, select committee scrutiny and negotiations with support parties. In May, the 
government had made the significant decision to delay the inclusion of the transport sector 
within the ETS from 2009 to 2011, with the Prime Minister explaining she was “very 
conscious” of financial pressure on households - a move strongly opposed by the Green 
Party (NZPA 2008). Further changes to the bill were introduced following the nearly 1000 
recommendations submitted by the select committee which reported back in June. 
However, the details of the ETS were not completed until the final hour following 
negotiations between the Labour government, New Zealand First and the Green Party. 
These negotiations would result in a number of changes being made to the bill immediately 
prior to its final Parliamentary reading and passing into law.  
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The Pressure Group Campaigns (KFA and SEAFIC) 
 
The question as to how carbon credits would be treated in the event of an emissions trading 
system being introduced had been a point of policy debate for a number of years, but it was 
during the government’s consultation over ETS design in 2007 that it became a particularly 
high profile issue and the forestry industry became mobilised. The Kyoto Forests Association 
(KFA) was established specifically to fight for forestry’s interests in respect to the ETS.28  
 
The KFA’s campaign was multi-dimensional. Forest owners were mobilised and encouraged 
to attend ETS consultation meetings to make their case and demonstrate their anger about 
the possibility of carbon credits being retained by the Crown. The KFA was highly visible in 
the media, issuing regular media statements and engaging with journalists. It also spent 
money on advertising, notably billboards, which established an especially high profile. Forest 
owners argued that government had previously signalled that carbon credits would be 
devolved to them in the event of a carbon regime being introduced, and that forestry 
investment had been influenced by this assumption. 
 
The KFA campaign was also notable for its confrontational nature and willingness to engage 
in an aggressive dialogue with the government. On the one hand, the KFA and its 
spokesman, Roger Dickie, were prepared to describe the government as “stealing” or 
“thieving” their carbon credits and, on the other, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Jim Anderton, accused the KFA of spreading “wilful ignorance and deceit” (Cumming 2007).  
 
Despite this animosity, the government decided that forest owners would be devolved post 
1990 carbon credits. This decision was revealed when the government’s preferred ETS 
                                                 
28 The New Zealand Forest Owners Association is the organisation that advocates for forestry’s broader public 
policy interests. 
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framework, which would form the basis of the Climate Change Bill, was made public in late 
2007. The KFA could claim a campaign success. The KFA would remain active and continue to 
advocate for additional amendments during the subsequent policy and legislative phases of 
the ETS, such as the devolution of carbon credits for pre 1990 forests, although not with the 
same degree of success. 
 
The fishing industry did not run a high profile ETS campaign akin to the KFA’s, but it was 
active in its policy engagement nevertheless. The Seafood Industry Council (SEAFIC) had, like 
many other sector groups, expressed strong concerns about the impact of the ETS on 
business competitiveness. For instance, it was one of 14 industry advocacy groups (others 
included Federated Farmers and the Road Transport Forum) to jointly send an open letter to 
all MPs in June 2008 claiming “the Climate Change bill, as reported back from Select 
Committee, has not taken heed of serious concerns raised by those in the productive sectors 
of the economy, the sectors which generate the export receipts and employment in New 
Zealand” (NZEEBW 2008). 
 
SEAFIC’s submission to the select committee argued that the fishing industry faced 
significant increases in fuel costs under an ETS and this would have a material impact on 
their ability to compete in an international market in which many of their competitors were 
not subject to carbon costs. Although the select committee had recommended some 
changes to the Climate Change Bill in response to the case made by SEAFIC, it did not 
recommend ETS relief similar to that being granted to other primary export sectors, such as 
agriculture, and did not meet the expectations of the fishing industry. "Our opposition to the 
Bill is due to the unfair treatment of the industry in respect of Government assistance … it 
does not remove the gross injustice of denying the industry the support offered to everyone 
else” (Symmans 2008). The select committee process was, however, not the end of the road 
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for the fishing industry. Ultimately, through direct engagement, the industry was able to 
secure support from New Zealand First, who negotiated 50 per cent ETS relief for the fishing 
industry as a part of the final deal that saw the government secure the votes necessary to 
pass the ETS into law. 
 
Waste Minimisation Bill 
 
In May 2008, Trevor Munro, President of the Scrap Metal Recycling Association of New 
Zealand (SMRANZ), told the New Zealand Herald the Waste Minimisation Bill threatened the 
viability of the New Zealand scrap metal export industry (Smith J 2008). Four months later, 
following an eleventh hour lobbying campaign, Munro welcomed the same bill’s passing into 
law.  
 
We absolutely support the purposes and objectives behind this Bill. It recognises the 
importance of minimising the amount of material going to landfill, which is the core of our 
business as scrap metal recyclers … We particularly applaud last night’s amendment that has 
narrowed the definition of “waste” in the Bill, meaning scrap metal and other material that 
has been diverted from the solid waste stream will not be considered “waste”, and will not 
be subject to many of the Bill’s controls that would have hamstrung our attempts to grow 
New Zealand’s 17th largest export industry (Munro 2008). 
 
Policy Background 
 
The main components of the Waste Minimisation Bill included a levy on industrial waste, 
targets for reducing waste in landfills and cleanfills, provision for producer responsibility 
programmes, and provision for public procurement programmes to spur the development of 
markets for products and services that result in waste reduction. Arguably the most 
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substantive aspect of the bill was the levy on industrial waste, “a blunt attempt at a Pigovian 
tax, to internalise environmental externalities” (Tanczos 2008). SMRANZ’s lobbying was 
primarily concerned with this levy.  
 
The bill was several years in evolution. Its first iteration was drafted as a members’ bill29 by 
Green MP, Mike Ward. By the time the bill received its first Parliamentary reading30, in June 
2006, Ward had lost his seat in Parliament at the 2005 election.31 Consequently, the bill was 
adopted, championed and introduced to Parliament by another Green MP, Nandor Tanzcos. 
During its introduction to Parliament, Tanczos granted most credit to Ward, as well as 
acknowledging the work of Chris Teo-sherrell (a Palmerston North City Councillor and 
environmental advocate) and Lucy White (of the Zero Waste New Zealand Trust). “I do not 
claim any great wisdom for myself. I inherited the bill from Mike Ward, and I thank him for 
the valuable work he did. I also thank Lu White and Chris Teo-sherrell, who probably deserve 
more credit than any of the politicians do” (Tanczos 2006).32  
 
The Waste Minimisation Bill continued to be influenced and crafted by many different 
political players. Having started life as a private members’ bill, drafted by a combination of 
Green MPs and environmental advocates, it was subsequently subject to significant 
amendments by a select committee, adopted as a government bill and subject to further 
changes before finally becoming law.33  
 
                                                 
29 Members’ bills are one of four types of bills that can be introduced to Parliament (the others being 
government, local and private bills). “The main purpose of these bills is to provide MPs with the opportunity to 
influence legislation separate from the government. It is an important democratic mechanism which ensure that 
the order of business in Parliament is not the exclusive domain of the government” (Spindler 2009, 52). 
30 Bills undertake a passage through Parliament that requires three readings before they are passed into law. 
31 Mike Ward was ranked 8th on the Green Party list for the 2005 election, but with the Green Party securing a 
disappointing 5 per cent of the total vote, only 6 Green MPs were elected to Parliament.  
32 Nandor Tanczos, ‘Waste Minimisation (Solids) Bill’, First Reading, Parliament, 14 June 2006. 
33 Interestingly, from her analysis of members’ bills under MMP, Spindler concluded that “members’ bills have 
not experienced a significant increase in the number being passed into law since MMP. The number of bills which 
achieve success remains relatively low.” (Spindler 2009, 79). 
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The Politics of the Waste Minimisation Bill 
 
After it was drawn from the ballot, Parliament voted to send the Waste Minimisation Bill to 
select committee by 68 votes to 51, with the Greens, Labour, the Maori Party, the 
Progressives and New Zealand First voting in favour, National and United Future voting 
against. However, the bill would have to wait two years and four days before it was returned 
to the debating chamber due to challenges securing sufficient political support for the bill. 
 
Labour was generally supportive of the bill and then Minister for the Environment, Hon 
Marian Hobbs, explained that it was both consistent with Labour’s environmental policy 
direction and timely given work underway at various government agencies (Hobbs 2006). 
Later, the government would adopt the bill as part of its own legislative agenda. According 
to Raukura Spindler: 
 
It [the bill] was drawn from the ballot at a time when the government was already seriously 
considering the need for greater action on controlling the amount of waste produced in New 
Zealand, and thus it received good support from the government (Spindler 2009).  
 
National was strongly opposed to the Waste Minimisation Bill in its original form, largely on 
the grounds of unnecessary bureaucracy and compliance requirements. “The Waste 
Minimisation (Solids) Bill is a garbage bill. It is PC rubbish that deserves to be thrown straight 
in the trash can. It is about wasting money, wasting paper, wasting energy, and—most 
important—wasting time” (Smith 2006). New Zealand First, while sharing a number of 
National’s concerns, voted in favour of allowing the bill to progress to the select committee 
stage (Brown 2006).  
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The Waste Minimisation Bill is notable for the role and influence of the select committee. 
When the bill was finally returned from select committee with unanimous support, following 
two submissions processes and hundreds of submissions, National MP Jacqui Dean told 
Parliament it had “been substantially rewritten” and that many of the National Party’s 
original objections to the bill – “things like the highly prescriptive requirements of 
compulsory waste plans … the complex and bureaucratic layers of administration” had been 
omitted (Dean 2008). Veteran National MP, Nick Smith, was also prompted to comment on 
the role of the committee: 
 
I have to say that out of all the select committees I have worked on, working on the Local 
Government and Environment Committee on this bill has been a pleasure. There has been a 
genuine process of engagement, with respective parties trying to do something of good in 
this area of waste management, and a willingness on the part of all parties to do a bit of 
compromising in order to try to come up with something that is workable (Nick Smith 2008). 
 
Consequently, despite a long and quite difficult legislative path, when the Waste 
Minimisation Bill was returned from the select committee it enjoyed cross-party support. 
This was the political context within which the scrap metal industry would be lobbying for 
further, last minute amendments. 
 
The Pressure Group Campaign (Scrap Metal Industry) 
 
The scrap metal industry was alarmed at the impact the proposed waste levy would have 
upon its profitability and export competitiveness. According to Mai Chen, SMRANZ’s public 
law advisor, the issue came down to the definition of “waste”.  “The definition chosen was 
very broad, including both material that is disposed of or discarded and recyclable material 
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that has not yet been recycled.” Consequently, “the Scrap Metal Recycling Association of 
New Zealand (SMRANZ) protested to [Russel] Norman, and to the responsible Minister” 
(Chen 2008). 
 
Although there was some media coverage of the scrap metal industry’s concerns (Smith J 
2008) and SMRANZ did make efforts to mobilise its constituency in protest against the bill, it 
is apparent that direct engagement and lobbying was the primary influence tool applied by 
SMRANZ. It is also apparent this direct engagement only gained traction late in the process 
and with the advice of a specialist public law firm. As Trevor Munro told the National 
Business Review,  SMRANZ had been “completely ignored” (Robertson 2008) in policy 
development of the bill, and even the select committee, in delivering substantial change to 
the bill, had not addressed SMRANZ’s concerns. 
 
Taxation Bill 
 
On 13 April 2006, the Ministers of Finance and Revenue, the Hon Dr Michael Cullen and Hon 
Peter Dunne, issued a statement unequivocally rejecting calls by investment firm Guinness 
Peat Group (GPG) for changes to proposed foreign investment tax rules. The two Ministers 
went as far as to insist that “its [GPG’s] call for a special exemption makes no sense in terms 
of tax policy or fairness” (Cullen and Dunne 2006). Dunne also declared that "If GPG … want 
to propose further changes, they are free to do so during the select committee's 
consideration of the relevant legislation” (Dunne 2006[a]). 
 
Yet only four days later the Government announced a 5-year holiday from the new rules for 
overseas portfolio investments and shares in certain types of widely held foreign companies 
that had a substantial New Zealand shareholder base. There was only one company that met 
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the criteria for the “holiday” included in the bill introduced to the House for its first reading, 
GPG. This reversal was not only rapid; it was also a source of political embarrassment seized 
upon by the Opposition. The current Prime Minister, John Key, was one of several National 
MPs to exploit the Government’s discomfort when he inquired whether it would “cave in to 
any other companies if they too start to take out full-page ads in the newspaper” (Key 2006). 
Key’s reference to full-page advertisements provides some explanation as to how GPG could 
achieve a comprehensive public policy reversal and victory in such a short space of time. It is 
only part of the explanation. 
 
Policy Background 
 
The Taxation (Annual Rates, Savings Investment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill was 
intended to reform the taxation of income from share investments and to introduce a more 
level taxation playing field for different kinds of investments. David Young provided a 
relatively straightforward explanation of a very complex issue:  
 
Offshore investment is foreign to most of us. And the tax rules take some working out, too. 
Simply put, what tax you pay depends on a “Grey List” of seven countries. If you invest 
directly in a company in one of the Grey List countries, you just pay tax when you get 
dividends. Invest elsewhere and you’re hit with a capital gains tax. The idea behind the Grey 
List is to promote investment in countries with tax systems similar to ours and to discourage 
investment in tax havens … Some believe that the list should be expanded to include more 
countries. But the Labour-led government, which worries that the system favours 
“sophisticated” investors, has gone the other way and announced that it will dismantle the 
Grey List, leaving just Australia (Young 2006).  
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Young also observed “those hardest hit will be senior employees of multinationals who have 
been paid in stock, and some investors in companies like Guinness Peat Group (GPG) …” 
(Young 2006). 
 
The bill was the outcome of an extensive consultation and policy process. Putting aside the 
preliminary policy work undertaken by officials, it was 18 months after the policy 
consultation document was released that enabling legislation was finally passed. That 
consultation document was met by approximately 800 submissions. Hundreds more 
submissions would be made to the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee during its 
consideration of the bill.  
 
The Politics of the Taxation Bill 
 
There was political history to the changes and objectives captured in the Taxation Bill. Both 
the Labour Government of the 1980s and the National Government of the 1990s had been 
unsuccessful in attempts to tidy up investment taxation rules. As noted by former Chair of 
the Finance and Expenditure Committee, Labour MP Shane Jones, “no one less than Sir 
Roger Douglas recently commented to me … that this problem has bedevilled many 
Governments. It caused him some consternation and it defeated Ruth Richardson” (Jones 
2006). Given this difficult political history and the exhaustive work undertaken by officials to 
bring the bill together, it was not surprising that the two responsible Ministers, Cullen and 
Dunne, were firmly committed to having the bill passed. Yet despite a general Parliamentary 
consensus that the existing investment taxation rules were inconsistent and distortionary, 
the bill’s legislative path was not assured.  
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In introducing the bill for its final reading, Peter Dunne claimed that “essentially, at the end 
of it, the differences between the parties come down to some relatively minor points” 
(Dunne 2006[c]). Nevertheless, the National Party had decided not to support the 
Government’s new investment tax regime. National voted against the bill going to select 
committee and it was, therefore, reasonable for Cullen and Dunne to assume the National 
Party was unlikely to vote for the Bill whatever the outcome of the select committee process 
(which proved to be the case). The Labour-led Government would need support from 
Parliament’s smaller parties. 
 
While the Green Party supported the bill going to select committee, it sought more 
substantial taxation reform. This was not on the agenda. The Greens considered the bill did 
not resolve important taxation distortions (particularly the lack of a capital gains tax) – 
“Overall, it replaces a dog’s breakfast with a different kind of dog’s breakfast” (Fitzsimons 
2006). The Green Party abstained on the final vote. ACT and the Maori Party also voted 
against the bill. The positions taken by the National Party, the Green Party, the Maori Party 
and ACT left the Labour-led government dependent on support from Peter Dunne’s United 
Future and, significantly, New Zealand First. Ultimately, the Taxation Bill was voted into law 
by 61 votes in favour (Labour, New Zealand First, United Future, the Progressives) to 53 
against (National, ACT, the Maori Party) and 6 abstaining (the Green Party). 
 
The Pressure Group Campaign (GPG) 
 
GPG objected to the proposed legislation on the grounds that it would introduce a capital 
gains tax for those of its 28,000 New Zealand shareholders with at least $50,000 in shares, 
because GPG, while a predominantly New Zealand-owned company, is domiciled in the 
United Kingdom.  “GPG is peculiar. It has an office in London and is recognised here as a 
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foreign company. Yet, four of its five directors are Kiwis, as are 28,000 of its 32,000 
shareholders” (Young 2006). The financial markets certainly viewed the proposal as a serious 
risk to GPG, with its share price taking a “pounding” according to the New Zealand Herald 
(Inder 2006[a]) and GPG even suggested publicly that it could pull out of New Zealand if the 
proposals were introduced (Inder 2006[b]). 
 
From an early stage, GPG argued it should be given an exemption from the new rules and 
treated like an Australian company (the one country that would continue to be treated as 
per the previous Grey List). GPG’s campaign combined direct lobbying, aggressive media and 
grassroots activity. “Spearheaded by GPG’s New Zealand director Tony Gibbs, the campaign 
includes a dedicated website for shareholders, a planned advertising campaign aimed at 
‘grassroots New Zealanders’ and intense political lobbying. GPG shareholders are being 
urged to write direct to Prime Minister Helen Clark and to attend the select committee 
hearings to consider the empowering legislation” (McManus 2006). The GPG Chairman, Tony 
Gibbs, was open about the fact that he “went down to Wellington and lobbied hard” (Hill 
Cone 2006), supported by a public law firm, Russell McVeagh.  
 
Gibbs recalled “those people in corporate New Zealand who knew I was trying to do 
something basically said you will never, ever get anywhere” (Hill Cone 2006). Yet he 
returned from Wellington with a five year exemption for GPG, a significant achievement 
given the government’s initially intransigent position and publicly stated opposition to any 
special case allowance for GPG. This was also achieved in a relatively short period of time – 
following the policy and consultation work of the government but before the bill received its 
first reading in the House and before it was referred to a select committee.  
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Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 
 
“After five years of fitful debate the government has given up its attempt to control a wide 
range of health products … through a joint licensing agency with Australia” (New Zealand 
Herald 2007). The decision to suspend the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 
represented the rare acknowledgement of Parliamentary defeat for an incumbent 
government. It was a particularly disappointing defeat for its primary champion over several 
years, Labour Cabinet Minister Annette King.  
 
Policy Background 
 
The Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill was a long (nearly 400 pages) and complex bill. 
It sought to establish a new scheme for the joint trans-Tasman regulation of therapeutic 
products, covering the manufacture, supply, importing, exporting, and promotion of 
therapeutic products; the setting of quality, safety, and performance standards for 
therapeutic products; post-market monitoring; and the enforcement of the scheme’s 
requirements. It was also a bill with a “long and complex history” (Stewart 2006) that 
stretched across all three terms of the 5th Labour-led government (1999-2002; 2002-2005; 
2005-2008).  
 
In 2001, the Australian and New Zealand Governments first reached an in-principle 
agreement to establish a joint agency for the regulation of therapeutic products, with the 
fundamental objective of “removing unnecessary barriers to trade for Australian and New 
Zealand therapeutic products industries” (Ministry of Health 2002). This was followed by the 
signing of an agreement/treaty to implement the joint agency by the two countries’ Health 
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Ministers in December 2003. Yet it would be three further years and another election before 
a bill was introduced to Parliament. As ACT MP, Heather Roy, explained: 
 
We have finally reached the point where, after 3 years of trying, the Government has 
managed to introduce this legislation, which was supposed to come before the House 6 
months after the treaty was signed. Three years down the track there has been a great deal 
of wheeling and dealing to get to this point where the bill can be introduced into the House 
(Roy 2006). 
  
The Politics of the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 
 
This was a policy and legislative initiative characterised by divergent views across 
Parliament, as well as a great deal of political dispute, accusation, negotiation and 
considerable political uncertainty. From the outset, Labour was firmly behind the 
establishment of a joint agency. It had decided there were trade and consumer safety 
benefits and, furthermore, it had negotiated the various agreements and commitments to 
implement the joint agency with the Australian government. It was clearly determined to 
deliver the legislation necessary to bring the agency to life.  
 
Opposition to the bill reflected a range of policy and philosophical concerns, as well as 
political opportunity. The most significant opposition to the bill was provided by the Green 
Party and the National Party, because without the support of either Labour’s majority was 
thin and dependent on an untidy collection of smaller parties (and independent MPs). The 
Green Party, marshalled by health spokesperson, Sue Kedgley, was staunchly opposed to the 
bill from 2002. The Greens were concerned about a combination of the loss of regulatory 
sovereignty, in addition to the cost and availability impacts on natural health business and 
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consumers. There was also proximity between their core political constituency and the 
natural health community that provided a strong political rationale for their involvement. 
Kedgley, in particular, was active in working with the natural health sector and mobilising 
opposition to the bill.  
 
The National Party’s opposition was interesting because it left the party prone to 
accusations of inhibiting more open trade and closer ties with Australia (both objectives it 
had publicly supported and advocated). However, despite support for the bill amongst 
sections of the medical community and business sector and accusations it was breaching its 
own principles for the sake of embarrassing an embattled government, the National Party 
stuck to its opposition based on concerns about compliance and regulatory costs.  
 
In addition to explanations of political philosophy and opportunism, it is also apparent that 
some parties and politicians were aggrieved at the bill’s management and that this may have 
stiffened their resolve in opposition to it. Kedgley commented that Annette King’s decision 
to pre-empt the 2003 Health Select inquiry into a joint regulatory agency – by announcing 
the signing of the treaty with Australia – had a significant impact on attitudes towards the 
bill and towards the government’s attempts to progress it (Kedgley 2009).  Heather Roy 
recalled that this decision to pre-empt resulted in “a great deal of grumpiness in the select 
committee about that by all the Opposition members at the time” and that “we held what 
was widely agreed to be an unprecedented press conference. Members from all sides of the 
House—apart from those in the Labour Government—came forward and were united in 
their contempt … “ (Roy 2006). 
 
It was a compromise (the “wheeling and dealing” referred to above by Roy), under which 
fifty per cent of the regulatory costs facing the complementary medicines sector would be 
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subsidised, that enabled Labour to secure support from New Zealand First and United Future 
to have the bill introduced to Parliament and directed to select committee, but only by the 
barest of margins (61 votes in favour and 60 votes against). “For New Zealand First, the 
achievement of a fifty percent subsidy and the protection of New Zealand’s sovereignty tips 
the scales in favour of supporting this bill going to a select committee so that constructive 
debate can begin” (Stewart 2006).  
 
Even with the proposed subsidy, the bill continued to encounter strong opposition from 
sections of the natural health industry, much of it directed at the select committee process. 
Following the submissions process and its deliberations, the select committee majority 
concluded it could not recommend the bill progress. Despite the select committee’s 
recommendation, the Labour-led government continued to search for deals and 
compromises to secure the votes necessary for the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill 
to be passed into law, a challenge that became increasingly difficult when independent MPs 
Taito Phillip Field and Gordon Copeland announced they would vote against it (Hazelhurst 
2007).  
 
This forced the government to explore a range of options and compromises. At one stage, 
the possibility of a hitherto unlikely agreement with the ACT Party was touted (Trevett 
2007). A compromise put forward by New Zealand First, in which complementary medicine 
businesses “would only need to meet the regulations of the trans-Tasman agency if they 
wished to operate in Australia” was explored, but also came to nothing. The Government 
finally conceded defeat in July 2007. 
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The Pressure Group Campaign 
 
Opposition to the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill centred around confidence in the 
comparative safety of complementary medicines, the perceived high cost of the proposed 
regime (with implications for product cost and availability as well as business viability) and 
the consequent argument that it was inappropriate to impose a pharmaceutical model of 
regulation and licensing upon them (Government Administration Committee 2007).  
 
The comments of several politicians reflect the significant profile and impact of the public 
campaign orchestrated by sections of the natural health industry, well supported by the 
Green Party. United Future MP Judy Turner is one example. “I have to say that this was the 
very first issue, on arriving in Parliament in 2002, that hit our desks. All the letters and 
emails—and I mean all of them—were from consumers of complementary products. In fact, 
we were so thoroughly lobbied by complementary medicine consumers that it took me 
some weeks to discover that the proposal actually included pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, as well” (Turner 2006). As noted by Catherine Masters of the New Zealand Herald, 
“Some in the pro-vitamin lobby went ballistic about the bill. They went on marches, chanted 
and spent big money on an advertising campaign which suggested natural health businesses 
would go bust and products would disappear” (Masters 2007). 
 
Kedgley gave much credit for the campaign to Dave Sloane and the NZ Health Trust, which 
Sloane set up to lead opposition to the bill. She also identified current National MP, then 
lawyer and lobbyist for the NZ Health Trust, Amy Adams, for the influential role she played. 
Another key group was Health Freedom New Zealand, an advocate for health consumer 
choice, and it was the bringing together of the mobilisation capability of groups such as 
Health Freedom New Zealand and the NZ Health Trust, along with the professional lobbying, 
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that made for such an effective - “almost text book” - campaign (Kedgley 2009). She also 
observed that this mobilisation, along with the flood of letters and emails to 
Parliamentarians and select committee members in the early stages, was especially 
important because until that point the “media [had] completely ignored the issue … It was 
totally under the radar” (Kedgley 2009).  
 
Having described the methodology for analysing and examining the five hypotheses set out 
in Chapter 2 and having provided a description of the key policy, political and campaign 
features of four case studies, the thesis now enters its key analytical phase. In respect to 
each of the hypotheses, Chapter 5 draws together the findings and observations from the 
expert interviews, supported by evidence and examples from the four case studies, as well 
as other relevant pressure group engagements, public policy decisions and outcomes.
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Chapter 5 – Pressure Group Behaviour and Influence Examined 
 
Examining the Pressure Group Hypotheses 
 
Five hypotheses relating to the expected behaviour of New Zealand pressure groups under 
MMP were set out in Chapter 2. These hypotheses were based on the predictions and 
expectations of New Zealand academics and commentators as well as a review of the 
international literature, in particular, that literature relating to the behaviour of pressure 
groups in democracies with stronger legislatures and more fragmented public policy 
decision-making structures. 
 
The five hypotheses are tested below based on the expert interviews and public policy case 
studies described in Chapter 4. 
 
First Hypothesis:  On account of the wider distribution of decision-making power under 
MMP than FPP, pressure groups would develop a range of political and Parliamentary 
relationships and would be increasingly prepared to engage with politicians and political 
parties across the political spectrum.  
 
The consistent view of the politicians, public law specialists, government relations 
consultants and pressure group leaders interviewed is that pressure groups have, on the 
whole, met this expectation. They have developed a wider set of political relationships and 
attempted to influence policy through a range of political access points.  This was a 
recurrent theme arising from the interviews and research. There have been several notable 
features of this important aspect of pressure group behaviour under MMP.  
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First, there has been an increased willingness to engage with political parties and politicians 
outside the Executive. According to Tony Friedlander: 
 
The emphasis used to be on Ministers and their key officials with a slightly lesser emphasis 
on key opinion makers within the respective caucuses … Now if you’re looking, especially to 
oppose someone, you use the wider range of potential weaknesses that the government 
have got (Friedlander 2008). 
 
Pressure groups have adjusted to the redistribution of decision-making power away from 
the Executive and reflected the reality of the numbers in Parliament. Each of the public 
policy case studies outlined in Chapter 4 involved pressure groups actively lobbying both the 
opposition and Parliament’s minor parties.  Furthermore, particularly in the case of the 
Taxation Bill, the ETS and the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill, GPG, the KFA and the 
natural medicines community were willing to engage in campaigns that involved a high level 
of confrontation with the Executive. They were prepared to openly court opposition parties 
and put their relationship with the Executive under considerable stress.  
 
Significantly, it is evident the key to successful lobbying in opposition to Executive policy is 
the ability to take advantage of the balance of power in Parliament and, in particular, the 
ability to secure a political ally with “political leverage”.  Political leverage is the bargaining 
power enjoyed by a political party, politician or group of politicians in respect to a particular 
bill by virtue of the Executive’s dependence on that party’s support to pass legislation. The 
importance of political leverage or “the power at the margin” (Saunders 2008) was raised 
frequently during the expert interviews.  
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This political leverage is often exercised through carefully guarded inter-party negotiations 
held outside the public eye. Consequently, demonstrating direct links between the political 
balance of power and specific policy outcomes can be difficult. However, the lobbying and 
political engagement of the fishing industry and GPG in relation to the ETS and Taxation Bill 
respectively is illustrative of the success that pressure groups can achieve when they secure 
a political ally with leverage. 
 
When the National Party withdrew its support for the Labour Government’s ETS legislation  - 
and with ACT, United Future and the Maori Party also voting against it - the fate of ETS 
legislation rested with New Zealand First and the Green Party. Lengthy negotiations between 
Labour, New Zealand First and the Green Party continued through July and August 2008 as 
both parties sought changes to the legislation. When New Zealand First leader, Winston 
Peters, finally declared New Zealand First’s intention to support the ETS he lauded the 
concessions negotiated by his party to protect households and the elderly from the full costs 
of the ETS (Peters 2008). However, he failed to mention the Labour Party had also agreed to 
a clause granting the fishing industry relief from 50 per cent of its ETS liabilities.  
 
This late amendment was clearly a compromise. There was no precedent for the granting of 
emissions credits to the extent of 50 per cent of an industry’s liabilities in the legislation and 
SEAFIC had sought a substantially higher level of shelter. Nevertheless, it was a significant 
result for SEAFIC, particularly given it had been unsuccessful in achieving any meaningful ETS 
relief at either the consultation or select committee phases of the policy process. Although 
the fishing industry’s win was not widely noted in the mainstream media it was observed in 
the blogosphere. Wellington-based political blog, The Hive34, declared it was “amazed that 
                                                 
34 The Hive (wellingtonhive.blogspot.com) was dedicated to the monitoring of developments in central, regional 
and local politics from its base in Wellington. It was established in November 2007 in reaction to the proposed 
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this is passing below the radar screen. The revised ETS contains an enormous new subsidy 
for the fishing industry. This was, surprise, surprise35 negotiated by New Zealand First” (The 
Hive 2008). 
 
New Zealand First also played a critical, and similar, role in respect to GPG’s exemption from 
the Taxation Bill. In fact, the GPG exemption is an even more striking illustration of the 
exploitation of political leverage given the government had so adamantly and publicly 
denied there was any policy rationale for the exemption. Again, the government was reliant 
on New Zealand First’s support to have the Taxation Bill passed into law. 36 In this case, the 
political leverage was exercised at an earlier stage of the policy process, prior to the bill’s 
introduction to the House, as alluded to by National MP Lockwood Smith during 
Parliamentary debate: 
 
Why did he [Minister Cullen] just change the policy for investors in the Guinness Peat Group? 
I see Peter Dunne smiling. What or who twisted Dr Cullen’s arm on this … Was it Winston 
Peters, who said to Dr Cullen that his support depended on that change being made? I would 
say there was a fair bit of murkiness in the background (Lockwood Smith 2006).  
 
As these two case studies demonstrate, political leverage can be a very influential source of 
policy influence for pressure groups. It can even deliver substantial policy reversals on the 
part of government. However, the reality is that pressure groups, even under MMP, are only 
                                                                                                                                            
Electoral Finance Act but also took a close interest in the Emissions Trading Scheme during 2008. The Hive has 
not been active since November 2008. 
35 The financial relationship between New Zealand First and fishing interests is well documented. For instance, it 
was revealed by the Dominion Post in 2008 that New Zealand First had received substantial undisclosed 
donations from the Vela family, who have significant commercial interests in the fishing sector. Former Minister 
of Fisheries, Hon Jim Anderton, also claimed that “Opposition from certain sections of the fishing industry, as well 
as from United Future and NZ First, meant the government couldn’t get a majority for the amendment [to 
section 10 of the Fisheries Act].” These amendments would have allowed the minister to take into account the 
“precautionary principle” when setting fish catch quotas. Anderton also remarked, “it is very disturbing to now 
read about the nature of the financial ties between the industry and some parties” (Thomas 2008). 
36 The Taxation Bill passed its final reading by 63 votes to 51. If New Zealand First had voted against the bill it 
would not have been passed. 
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able to profit from the political leverage in quite specific circumstances. It requires a 
relationship or a philosophical alignment with a party or political grouping that happens to 
wield negotiating power. It also requires a willingness to exercise that leverage given that 
party’ s own political style and objectives as well as the wider, longer term context of the 
party’s political relationship with the government. 
 
Second, pressure groups have been willing to engage with politicians and political parties 
right across Parliament. There was an overwhelming view amongst the experts interviewed 
that pressure groups cannot rely on a single political relationship or on engagement with 
only the two major parties to be effective. For instance, Peter Conway noted that MMP has 
made the CTU “much more aware of the need to have a broad base of coalitions with 
people” and that “the notion of partnerships and working together on things has become 
more important” (Conway 2008). 
 
The expert interviews revealed many instances of pressure groups bringing together cross-
party support for their policy views and positions on an ad hoc, issue by issue basis. For 
example, Tony Friedlander described bringing together the “combined forces of ACT, Labour 
and others to bear when National was in power [pre-1999 election]” and those of “ACT, 
United Future and New Zealand First to get changes to the Labour Government’s approach.” 
Matthew Hooton recalled mustering support from the Greens, the Maori Party, ACT and 
United Future to support the forestry sector’s call for the devolution of ETS carbon credits 
(Hooton 2008) and Barrie Saunders described successful lobbying of parties across 
Parliament to prevent a ban on direct-to-consumer advertising being included in the 
Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill.37 As the then Minister of Health conceded in 
Parliament, “the Government’s preference was to ban direct-to-consumer advertising. 
                                                 
37 A ban of direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products had been advocated by sections of the 
medical profession for some time, but was opposed by some consumer groups and the pharmaceutical industry. 
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However, it is clear that there is not the necessary support within Parliament for that to 
happen at this point” (Hodgson 2006).  
 
The fate of the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill is another clear illustration of the 
success pressure groups can have, and have had, under MMP by mustering support or 
opposition for a policy from across multiple parties. Similarly, cross-party lobbying was the 
key to the scrap metal industry’s success in achieving the late redefinition of “waste” within 
the Waste Minimisation Bill. According to Mai Chen38, this amendment could not have been 
achieved without the type of minority coalition government common under MMP (Chen 
2008):   
 
Neither the Greens nor the Minister would agree to see SMRANZ, so instead they went to 
the other parties. The National Party agreed to put up an SOP [Supplementary Order Paper] 
which would remove scrap metal from the definition of waste, and lobbying resulted in a 
majority commitment of 63 votes in favour of the National Party SOP.” In turn, “the Greens, 
the Minister’s advisers, and the Ministry for the Environment officials who had originally 
advised on the Government SOP then agreed to meet with SMRANZ” and a compromise SOP 
was negotiated between SMRANZ, the Greens and the Government (Chen 2008). 
 
Despite these many examples of cross-Parliamentary pressure group engagement, there was 
a common view that some groups were yet to fully adjust to the MMP environment. The 
dynamics and decision-making structures of MPP are not fully understood by all pressure 
groups (Clarke 2008). Consequently, there remained a tendency, particularly amongst those 
pressure groups and organisations not regularly involved in lobbying, to operate according 
to a FPP mentality and to focus solely on “the Minister and the Opposition” (Swain 2008). In 
relation to each of the four case studies, many of the pressure groups involved were advised 
                                                 
38 Mai Chen was SMRANZ’s public law advisor in respect to the Waste Minimisation Bill. 
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by government relations or public law experts (for example, the KFA, SMRANZ and GPG). 
That level of MMP understanding and awareness of the need for engagement with multiple 
parties cannot be assumed of other pressure groups.  
 
Second hypothesis: On account of their more diverse composition, fewer government 
chairs and a much reduced likelihood of government-majority membership, select 
committees would become a more valuable channel of engagement and policy influence 
for pressure groups than they had been under FPP. 
 
The most common view of the experts interviewed was that select committees had been 
more independent under MMP, had been more influential and had proved a more fruitful 
channel for pressure groups. This is consistent with the observations of a number of 
academics (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, Martin 2004). However, the opinions expressed by 
the experts interviewed were certainly not uniform. In particular, there were differing 
explanations as to the reasons for select committee influence under MMP and quite 
different views as to the extent of that influence. The interviews and case studies also 
revealed a complex relationship between select committee processes and inter-party policy 
negotiations, with significant implications for the engagement and influence of pressure 
groups. 
 
Shaw and Eichbaum described MMP select committees as “a critical point of entry into the 
legislative process” (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, 59) and Parliament’s “best kept secret” - 
capable of effecting “a substantial difference to policy” (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, 57). Their 
view from the outside is supported by Russel Norman’s from within. “Because of the 
numbers on select committees, we will often find ourselves with the deciding vote … it gave 
us a lot of power over the past nine years and the submissions really mattered” (Norman 
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2008). The numbers referred to by Norman demonstrate the extent of structural change to 
select committees under MMP, as discussed and set out above in Chapter 3.  
 
The lack of select committee majorities is viewed as one of the key reasons that pressure 
groups can achieve greater results through engagement with MMP select committees. As 
Norman observed, without a majority the government does not have the ability to control 
select committee recommendations. Of course, the Executive can ignore select committee 
recommendations if it chooses. Parliament ultimately determines the fate of legislation.39 As 
Norman commented: 
 
At the end of the day what the government is angling for is a majority in the House. Usually 
the numbers in the select committee will bear some relationship to the numbers in the 
House, so they’ll have to do the negotiating at the select committee phase. It varies though – 
sometimes they’ll just ignore the select committee (Norman 2008). 
 
For example, the 2005-2008 Labour government sought to pass the Therapeutic Products 
and Medicines Bill despite the Government and Administration Committee recommending it 
not proceed.40 However, an adverse recommendation from a select committee can 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of a bill, contribute significantly to public opinion and 
destabilise broader Parliamentary support, as was the case with the Therapeutic Products 
and Medicines Bill (Kedgley 2008). 
 
Furthermore, even when select committee recommendations are ignored by the Executive 
they can still provide a platform for ongoing lobbying and longer term success.   For 
                                                 
39 Sellens has argued that the fact Parliament has the final word on legislation may have discouraged pressure 
groups from focusing on select committees and targeting the Executive instead (Sellens 1998). 
40 The Financial Advisors Act and the Major Events Management Act are other examples of bills in respect to 
which select committee recommendations were not adopted by the government (Clarke 2008). 
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example, in 2006, the Labour-led government chose not to act upon a recommendation by 
the health select committee that the government restore Plunket’s contract for the 
provision of telephone-based nursing advice (Plunketline). The health committee had been 
chaired by Green Party MP Sue Bradford, and comprised MPs from a range of parties 
sympathetic to Plunket’s position, including the Green Party, United Future, the Maori Party 
and National. Due to the Labour-led government’s decision to ignore the select committee 
recommendation, there was no short-term result for Plunket from its submission to the 
committee. However, the awareness created by the submission and select committee 
report, along with associated media activity and lobbying41, led to the National Party 
committing to restore the contract in its 2008 election manifesto (NZPA 2008[b]).  
 
A second explanation as to the greater influence and value of select committees to pressure 
groups under MMP is that the government contingent on MMP select committees tends to 
be more open-minded and more “malleable” (Conway 2008). They need to take a more 
flexible view if they remain uncertain as to the parties and compromises that will secure a 
Parliamentary majority for a bill. For their part, non-government and minor parties are also 
inclined to retain an open position in respect to legislation in its early stages, as indicated by 
Norman: 
 
It is very common for us [the Green Party] to agree to support a bill to select committee, but 
make no further commitments … there will be other times on occasion, where something’s 
really big or important that the government seeks support for all stages, but generally we 
don’t give it because you give away all your power and you haven’t heard all the evidence 
(Norman 2008). 
 
                                                 
41 Some, including former Business New Zealand Executive Director Simon Carlaw, have actually argued that 
“select committees are most important for what happens around them – lobbying, media coverage, awareness 
campaigns etc” (Carlaw 2003).  
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Pressure groups, therefore, have an opportunity to achieve substantial shifts in government 
policy through select committee submissions. The Climate Change Bill is a good example of a 
bill introduced by the government with considerable policy questions and Parliamentary 
support still unresolved. According to Norman, submissions being made during the ETS 
select committee phase were being fed into the Green Party’s negotiations with the 
government (Norman 2008). Charles Chauvel, chair of the select committee that reviewed 
the ETS legislation, also considered that public submissions had influenced the ETS and that 
most of the issues addressed in the final bill had been “ventilated” at the select committee 
stage (Chauvel 2009). 
 
However, a number of experts and pressure group leaders remained unconvinced that the 
structural changes to select committees under MMP had resulted in any notable increase in 
the influence of select committees42 or considered the extent of select committee influence 
under MMP had not met the expectations that accompanied MMP’s introduction. According 
to Clarke: 
 
Yes [select committees] are leading to greater scrutiny, yes, they are leading to greater opportunity for 
pressure groups and, yes, pressure groups are obtaining amendments through the select committee 
stage that aren’t necessarily desired by the government or the architects of the legislation …. But, no, 
the full capacity and independence of select committees has not yet been achieved … … I don’t think it 
[the role of select committees] is anywhere near as significant and important as the architects of MMP 
and constitutional experts thought that it would be (Clarke 2008).  
 
First, it was generally agreed that although MMP select committees now reflected the 
broader political diversity and fragmentation of Parliament, they have not developed “lives 
                                                 
42 Former Business New Zealand Chief Executive Simon Carlaw went further, not only claiming “the greatest 
impact that MMP has had on the select committee process is that lobby groups have to talk to more people,” but 
that “select committees rarely influence, let alone change, policy decisions” (Carlaw 2003). 
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of their own” (Saunders 2008). There is often a government or Cabinet view as to what a 
select committee report should conclude and recommend (Conway 2008) and, in relation to 
matters of substantial policy or legislation that touches core philosophies, a party caucus will 
often require committee members to take a certain position or vote a particular way– which 
pressure groups are often not aware of (Swain 2008, Bailey 2008, Hooton 2008).43  
 
Second, the need for, and nature of, deal-making under MMP were cited as key constraints 
upon the role and influence of select committees. It was argued that the inter-party 
negotiations often result in policy deals being reached before draft legislation is introduced 
to Parliament or sent to a select committee for consideration (Clarke 2008, Friedlander 
2008). As a consequence, the ability of pressure groups to shift policy through submissions is 
limited. Where possible, pressure groups need to exert their influence prior to the legislative 
phase (Friedlander 2008). GPG’s Taxation Bill campaign is a compelling example of a 
pressure group lobbying aggressively, and successfully securing a policy deal on its behalf 
prior to the bill being sent to a select committee. The KFA’s primary campaign objective, a 
commitment from the government to devolve post 1990 carbon credits, was also achieved 
prior to the drafting of the ETS legislation and in advance of the select committee phase. 
 
The case studies also demonstrate that significant policy deals and compromises can be 
reached under MMP at very late stages of the policy process, following the select committee 
phase and sometimes producing policy outcomes never raised or contemplated during 
select committee submissions. In this case, the Climate Change Bill and the Waste 
Minimisation Bill provide clear examples. The policy deals between the Labour government, 
New Zealand First and the Green Party that secured the ETS, including the compromise that 
                                                 
43 Doug Bailey also noted that “other policy issues and legislation will be less politically sensitive, perhaps more 
technical in nature, which tends to allow select committee members greater freedom and discretion, albeit this 
was also the case under FPP” (Bailey 2008). 
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saw the fishing industry receive emissions credits to cover 50 per cent of liabilities, were 
struck just prior to the Climate Change Bill receiving its final Parliamentary reading.  
 
The expert interviews consistently emphasised the importance to pressure groups of 
understanding how the select committee phase of the policy process had been impacted by 
MMP. First, it was observed that select committees now operate parallel to inter-party 
negotiations under MMP (Norman 2008, Swain 2008). By contrast, the decision-making 
process under FPP was more linear and pressure groups could focus on each stage, including 
the select committee stage, in turn. Second, it was noted that pressure groups need to be 
aware there are opportunities to influence legislation beyond the select committee phase 
when inter-party negotiations and policy deals are yet to be finalised. According to Swain: 
 
Just because something has been decided or recommended by a select committee doesn't 
mean that's where it ends. There are going to be trade-offs and deals being done right 
outside the select committee process (Swain 2008). 
 
Norman cited the redefinition of “waste” achieved by SMRANZ within the Waste 
Minimisation Bill as an example of an amendment achieved through “heavy duty lobbying 
on behalf of the scrap metal dealers” subsequent and contrary to the report of the select 
committee (Norman 2008). Another example was the Employment Relations (Breaks, Infant 
Feeding and Other Matters) Amendment Bill 2008. Following from business interests and 
the late intervention of New Zealand First, the bill was amended to exclude the transport 
sector from its requirements (Conway 2008).  
 
In relation to the Climate Change Bill, Chauvel claimed that select committee submissions 
were taken into account in inter-party negotiations and that “there weren’t many changes 
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the Greens or New Zealand First wanted at select committee that we couldn’t 
accommodate.” Nevertheless, he acknowledged there were a few changes to the ETS 
introduced contrary to the recommendations of the select committee, notably the emissions 
credits granted to the fishing sector - the “classic example of how a select committee can go 
so far, but can be trumped by what’s finally the exercise of power – by ministers … that’s the 
way it works” (Chauvel 2009). 
 
The influence and role of select committees under MMP has changed. Select committee 
members remain constrained by party positions as was the case under FPP. Inter-party deals 
reached in advance of legislation arriving with select committees have also limited the 
extent to which pressure groups can effect policy change through the select committee 
process. Yet, given the rarity of government majorities on committees and given 
Parliamentary support can often be unsecured or provisional when bills are sent to select 
committees, the outcome of the select committee process is now less pre-determined and 
predictable. This has created opportunities for pressure groups and there are examples of 
pressure groups that have profited from these changes. 
 
The political and decision-making context within which select committees operate is more 
complicated under MMP. In particular, there is a complex and variable interface between 
the select committee process and inter-party policy negotiations. Often, select committee 
submissions supplement inter-party negotiations and contribute to the agreements that are 
reached. In some cases, however, inter-party negotiations can reverse or trump a select 
committee process or recommendation. This is not generally to the disadvantage of 
pressure groups. In fact, as was demonstrated by SMRANZ and SEAFIC in respect to the 
Waste Minimisation and Climate Change Bill, it allows pressure groups a final opportunity to 
achieve policy wins. However, this does require a relatively sophisticated awareness of the 
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political environment and the relationship between the select committee and the rest of 
Parliament.  “I don’t think you can look at select committees without considering the 
broader strategic Parliamentary situation” (Hooton 2008). This awareness is far from 
universal. Unlike GPG, the KFA or SMRANZ, many pressure groups do not have access to 
expert public law or government relations advice. Consequently, they often remain “too 
focused on the select committee and the submission” and need to develop strategies for 
engagement before, during and after the select committee process (Swain 2008). 
 
It is also very important to recognise MMP is not constant and that different MMP regimes 
can deliver quite variable political structures within which select committees will operate – 
with significant implications for pressure groups. During the first term of MMP government, 
the National-New Zealand First coalition majority (1996-98), Sellens concluded that “the 
wider diversity of parties, and therefore political opinion and ideology within select 
committees has not been fully exploited by lobbyists to create dissension within the 
committee, or to create a focus for media and public attention.” She argued that Cabinet 
was still powerful and this may have convinced pressure groups that select committees were 
not worth intensive lobbying. This contrasts with a generally more optimistic view of select 
committees and their value to pressure groups in 2008, a view shaped by three successive 
terms of MMP minority governments. In 1998, the then CTU Secretary, Angela Foulkes, 
claimed that select committees had not changed markedly with MMP, had no more power, 
and that “the only additional influence or power for lobbyists is if there is a division within 
government” (Sellens 1998, 35). On the other hand, current CTU Secretary Peter Conway 
described select committees as “starting with a more open negotiable position” and 
considered that select committees have been an increasingly worthwhile channel for 
pressure groups (Conway 2008).  
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Third hypothesis: On account of the increased policy influence of Parliament and the 
increased influence of political parties not represented within the Executive (therefore, 
without any direct relationship with the bureaucracy), the bureaucracy would be a less 
important channel of policy influence for pressure groups under MMP. Pressure groups 
would, in fact, find themselves increasingly in competition with the bureaucracy as 
providers of advice and information. 
 
According to the politicians, pressure group leaders, public law and government relations 
experts interviewed, the role of the bureaucracy in shaping policy remains very important 
and the bureaucracy is still a critical relationship and point of access for pressure groups.  
Correspondingly, changes to the nature of pressure group relationships with officials were 
not a prominent feature of the research and interview findings. They were secondary in 
emphasis. Nevertheless, the nature of the pressure group relationship with the bureaucracy 
has changed. There has been an ability for pressure groups to achieve policy outcomes 
without engagement with the bureaucracy and, sometimes, despite the views and advice of 
officials.   
 
“The role of officials is still very important” (Swain 2008) and there is no suggestion that 
under MMP pressure groups have placed any lesser emphasis on engagement with 
government officials through either formal policy consultation processes or through 
maintaining relationships with key officials and advisors. The Executive is still responsible for 
determining most of the policy and legislative agenda and, as the agent of the Executive, the 
bureaucracy still plays a very significant role in shaping policy and advising the government. 
In fact, as anticipated (Boston 1996), MMP has seen an increased emphasis on policy 
consultation by government agencies (Palmer 1999, Dunne 2006[d]), partly attributable to 
the need for minority governments to build a consensus around issues before seeking to 
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stitch together a Parliamentary majority for legislative action. The Taxation Bill and the 
Climate Change Bill are examples of bills introduced to Parliament following substantial 
public consultation carried out by government agencies on behalf of the Executive.44 
 
The continuing and substantial influence of the bureaucracy is illustrated by the emphasis 
placed on both structured and informal relationships by major pressure groups such as the 
CTU and Business New Zealand. For example, during the 2005-2008 term of the Labour-led 
government, CTU and Business New Zealand leadership met regularly with the Chief 
Executive and senior officials of the Department of Labour, while, below this leadership 
forum, departmental officials, CTU and Business New Zealand advisors were also regularly 
engaged and provided with policy papers for comment. Furthermore, this tripartite structure 
was supported by regular forums with the Minister of Labour. The Minister met fortnightly 
with the CTU, fortnightly with Business New Zealand and monthly with both organisations 
(Conway 2008).45 It is not evident these structures and relationships can necessarily be 
attributed to MMP. They are likely to reflect the Labour government’s style of political 
management and stakeholder engagement. However, they certainly support a view that 
pressure groups continue to place a high value on relationships with the bureaucracy.  
It also suggests that institutional pressure groups, such as the CTU and Business New 
Zealand, have retained a degree of ‘insider’ status under MMP despite the more fragmented 
policy and contestable policy environment.  
 
The bureaucracy remains important, but it is also the case that MMP has “substantially 
altered the environment in which the public service advises on, implements and evaluates 
                                                 
44 The Business Tax Review public discussion document was issued by the government in July 2005. The Taxation 
Bill was introduced to Parliament and sent to select committee for consideration in May 2006. It was voted into 
law in December 2006. 
45 Conway noted that this level of engagement did not occur during the 1990s and that these types of 
institutional structures and relationships with government agencies “had been wiped away” (Conway 2008). 
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public policy”. Significantly, from the pressure group perspective, “the virtual monopoly they 
(officials) once held over advice has gone (although not exclusively as a result of electoral 
change), and they now compete for the minister’s attention with other policy players in 
what has become a more cluttered, contested policy market” (Shaw and Eichbaum 2005,3).  
 
This competitive environment was described by several of the politicians, lobbyists and 
pressure group leaders interviewed. It was regarded as having strengthened the hand of 
pressure groups in their efforts to influence public policy, and enabling pressure groups to 
achieve policy results “against the wishes of officials”, which used to be very difficult without 
the supporting advocacy of a Minister (Clarke 2008).46 In some cases, the bureaucracy can 
act as a strong and determined advocate for policy initiatives. Indeed, Sue Kedgley described 
officials as “hell bent” on the introduction of a trans-Tasman therapeutic regulatory regime 
(Kedgley 2009). The Emissions Trading Scheme was also cited as illustrative of the 
competition that can exist between the advice and information streams of officials and 
pressure groups. “Officials have a very pure view of how an ETS system works [but] those 
officials are now only one of a series of advice streams” (Swain 2008).  
 
There have been two primary dimensions to the competitive dynamic between pressure 
groups and the bureaucracy. First, due to the more contestable nature of policy and the 
need for governments to gain a wider perspectives in order to build Parliamentary 
majorities, pressure groups have, at times, competed directly with officials as advisors to the 
Executive. In this respect, the role of political advisors has become increasingly influential 
and important to pressure groups. These advisors, appointed by the Executive and reporting 
                                                 
46 Notably, Friedlander contended that, due to the time and energy required of Ministers negotiating policy and 
legislation with support parties, MMP has resulted in officials taking on greater policy formulation responsibility 
(Friedlander 2008). There is another view that the increased difficulty progressing legislation through Parliament 
has led to an increased use of secondary legislation, often administered and significantly influenced by the 
bureaucracy (Bailey 2008).  
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directly to Ministers, provide an alternative channel (to the bureaucracy) for communicating 
to Ministers. Relationships with these political advisors are important to pressure groups 
(Friedlander 2008, Conway 2008).  
 
Second, pressure groups compete with officials through their relationships with, and the 
information they provide to, non-government political parties involved in policy negotiations 
and decision-making. Under MMP, the governing party is in a constant state of policy 
negotiation with support parties, which themselves have very limited access to the advice 
and information of the bureaucracy (except where they have been granted Executive 
positions)47. In this environment, there is an opportunity for pressure groups to ensure they 
are sufficiently connected to non-government political parties to supply information and 
advice that enables those parties to successfully engage with both the Executive and its 
advisors in the bureaucracy.  
 
For example, the Green Party was able to influence a range of policies - notably transport 
and environmental - from outside the Executive during the three terms of Labour-led 
government.48 It was a relationship with the Green Party that enabled Zero Waste New 
Zealand to play an influential role in the developing the initial policy, drafting and legislative 
progress of the Waste Minimisation Bill (Tanczos 2006, Norman 2008). On the other hand, 
SMRANZ achieved a late amendment and redefinition of waste through its engagement with 
several parties and involvement in negotiations with officials, the Green Party and the 
Minister for the Environment (Chen 2008). In both instances, pressure groups were an 
alternative source of advice and information to the bureaucracy. 
 
                                                 
47 Green MPs did have direct access to officials where they were granted responsibility for specific government 
programs, such as Buy Kiwi Made and Energy Efficiency, under the 2005-2008 Labour-led government. 
48 According to Paul Swain, the Green Party had a notable influence over transport policy and legislation during 
his term as Minister of Transport, on account of their status as a government support party (Swain 2008). 
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It is important not to overstate the change in the relationship between pressure groups and 
the bureaucracy under MMP. The bureaucracy remains a key player in the policy process 
and pressure groups continue to place a strong emphasis on their relationships and access to 
officials. However, MMP has increased the opportunities for pressure groups to bypass the 
bureaucracy and, where the need arises, to provide competitive information and advice to 
the Executive or channel it through non-governing political parties. Pressure groups have 
achieved significant policy outcomes contrary to the advice of officials (and often contrary to 
the Executive) as a result. And while some major pressure groups retain an institutional 
status and structural relationships with government agencies, MMP has increased the need 
for the government and its agencies to consult with a wider range of stakeholders and 
pressure groups. 
 
The Fourth Hypothesis: On account of public policy under MMP being increasingly 
sensitive to public opinion and on account of a lesser risk associated with alienating a less 
powerful Executive, media and public/constituency mobilisation techniques would be 
more successful and more popular tools of pressure group influence under MMP than FPP. 
 
MMP governments have been sensitive and responsive to public opinion (Swain 2008, 
Norman 2008).  “If you can get the public or the media on your side that will help your case 
enormously” (Norman 2008).49 There have been many examples of pressure groups 
undertaking media campaigns and mobilising their constituents or the general public in 
order to influence MMP public policy. The KFA campaign in relation to the ETS, GPG’s 
                                                 
49 For example, in respect to the ETS, Charles Chauvel noted that as the campaign against the ETS mounted, it 
“resulted in an Executive decision to modify the ETS proposal and to push out some of the deadlines – principally 
for agriculture and stationary energy” (Chauvel 2009). 
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campaign in relation to the Taxation Bill and the campaign in opposition to the Therapeutic 
Products and Medicines Bill are all examples.  
 
However, it is more difficult to establish that this sensitivity, and the willingness of pressure 
groups to engage in media and mobilisation activity, has been directly attributable to MMP.  
Pressure groups in New Zealand have a long history of this activity and governments have 
always been conscious of public opinion. Further, indirect influence levers, including media 
and mobilisation, are often pursued in conjunction with direct approaches to decision-
makers. Consequently, their influence is difficult to isolate. Governments can also be 
reluctant to acknowledge that policy has been altered on account of a campaign, in case it is 
interpreted as a sign of political weakness, a compromise of principle, or encourages other 
groups to mobilise in respect of their issues.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a general, if not universal, view amongst the experts interviewed that 
MMP has increased the influence and value to pressure groups of media and mobilisation 
activity, particularly through the potential to create a sense of political opportunity or risk 
for minor parties. For example, Bailey argued: 
 
There is a greater responsiveness and sensitivity to public opinion where there is an 
opportunity for a party, a minor party in particular, to differentiate itself or brand itself – and 
that will influence the political dynamic (Bailey 2008). 
 
Without overstating the effect, Conway also considered MMP had created opportunities for 
minor parties to achieve exposure via the media and this had, in turn, created opportunities 
for pressure groups, including the CTU. “There can be quite a large public constituency in 
respect to an issue, from which a third party can secure quite a platform. This acts as quite a 
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discipline on policy.” Conway cited the Free Trade Agreement with China as an example 
(Conway 2008). This agreement had the broad support of both the Labour and National 
parties, but consequently provided an opportunity for minor parties, notably the Green 
Party and New Zealand First, to secure a profile through their opposition and public 
criticisms (Young 2008[b]. There was also a suggestion that smaller parties can be more 
inclined to adopt pressure group issues on account of their tendency to focus on smaller, 
niche constituencies and their proximity to MMP’s five per cent threshold.50   
 
Although it is difficult to be definitive about the relative sensitivity of policy to public 
campaigns under FPP and MMP, there are some clear findings from the research relating to 
pressure group use of media and mobilisation techniques. First, they are most effective 
when they are connected to, and extensions of, lobbying campaigns that take account of the 
political balance of power. Several of the case studies are illustrative. The government’s 
decision to reverse its position and grant GPG an exemption in respect to the Taxation Bill 
has been credited to “well-funded grassroots lobbying including an intense letter-writing 
and advertising campaign” (McManus 2006). However, the campaign would not have been 
successful without the decision of New Zealand First to support GPG’s position and exercise 
its political leverage. It is evident the public campaign had taken account of the 
configuration of government and the balance of power. Most importantly, it targeted the 
electorate of the New Zealand First leader, Hon Winston Peters:  
 
The Independent understands [Bruce] Sheppard [Shareholders Association founder] plans 
writing to GPG shareholders in the electorates of the two MPs holding the balance of power 
in the coalition government – New Zealand First leader and Foreign Affairs Minister Winston 
                                                 
50 “The media and polling activity is now being watched a lot more closely by the smaller parties who know that if 
they are hanging around the five percent threshold they need to be wary of public opposition to a policy" (Swain 
2008). “If you are after five per cent constituency you will take a different approach to a party after forty per 
cent, and so we are seeing that kind of politics playing out” (Conway 2008). 
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Peters and United Future Leader Peter Dunne – to explain the implications of the tax 
(McManus 2006). 
 
In regard to the KFA’s high profile campaign demanding the government devolve carbon 
credits to forest owners, Matthew Hooton noted “you couldn’t separate the lobbying from 
the public dimension to the campaign because it was all about getting the numbers in 
Parliament.” The KFA’s campaign during 2006 and 2007 was multi-dimensional and involved 
extensive, aggressive media activity, public meetings and billboards. It is widely perceived as 
having “eventually succeeded in getting post-1990 carbon credits returned to forest 
owners,” (NZEEBW 2008[b]) but fundamentally, success depended on the direct lobbying of 
those parties who held the legislative balance of power. The media and mobilisation activity 
provided the platform for that lobbying to prevail. 
 
It is evident from the frequent references of politicians in Parliament that the mobilisation of 
the natural medicines community and the associated marches, letter writing and media 
coverage placed the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill squarely in the consciousness 
of politicians. It elevated awareness of the issue, the opposition as well as the sense of 
political risk and opportunity. However, it was this profile in conjunction with expert direct 
lobbying of Parliament that made the campaign to oppose the bill especially powerful 
(Kedgley 2008).  
 
Second, MMP pressure groups have been willing to engage in highly confrontational 
campaigns in opposition to Executive policy - and have been successful in doing so. The KFA 
campaign was particularly hostile. It involved aggressive advertising and involved the KFA 
engaging in a public war of words with the Minister for Forestry, even describing the 
government and its officials as “carbon credit thieves” (NZPA 2007). GPG’s campaign was 
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also bold and confrontational. It involved an aggressive media campaign, full page 
advertisements and direct communications to all GPG’s 28,000 New Zealand shareholders 
urging them to write to the Prime Minister.  GPG did not engage in the same degree of 
hostile accusation as the KFA, but it was prepared to deliver implicit political threats.51 These 
campaigns are arguably not surprising when it has already been established that MMP 
pressure groups have been willing to openly lobby Parliament in opposition to Executive 
policy. Neither should the success of the KFA and GPG campaigns be considered surprising 
when it has also been established that media and mobilisation campaigns are most effective 
when they are an extension of a lobbying campaign that is conscious of the political balance 
of power in respect to a particular policy issue.   
 
The Fifth Hypothesis: On account of the greater contestability of policy and a longer, more 
consultative policy process under MMP than FPP, information would be an increasingly 
valuable resource for pressure groups – although the most effective use of that 
information will require a more sophisticated ability to tailor information and policy 
arguments according to a more complex political environment. 
 
Despite the greater contestability of policy and the longer, more publicly visible policy 
process, there is no compelling evidence or prevalence of opinion that information has been 
a more influential tool for pressure groups under MMP. Information is important under 
MMP, but no more important that it was under FPP (Friedlander 2008). Pressure groups 
have, however, demonstrated a tendency under MMP to organise their information and 
articulate their arguments in a more nuanced manner, depending on the political audience.  
 
                                                 
51 For instance, during the campaign, GPG Chairman commented that “it’s something New Zealand shareholders 
and investors have to cope with” and “no doubt this will reflect on how they vote in the next election” (McManus 
2006). 
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Information does play an important role in policy influence and policy decision-making. This 
was the case under FPP and it remains the case under MMP. However, the nature of policy is 
such that the role of information is going to have limitations under either regime. Policy is 
subjective and often determined on the basis of preferences, values, and sometimes politics, 
as much as information. Consequently, it was perhaps optimistic to expect MMP to have a 
marked impact on the value of information to pressure groups.  
 
The research and interviews did reveal some important issues relating to both the role of 
information and the manipulation of information by pressure groups under MMP. First, it 
was argued the nature of inter-party negotiations under MMP and the potential for policy to 
be determined on the basis of deals and compromises had resulted in some policy outcomes 
that lacked transparency and lacked a clear relationship to the evidence and associated 
policy debate. This had occurred despite MMP creating the opportunity for “more 
deliberative processes” and “more analytical decision-making” (Clarke 2008, Bailey 2008). 
The Climate Change Bill and the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill provide examples.  
 
Despite a lengthy policy development process and months of select committee 
consideration, the fishing industry had been unable to secure any significant shelter from its 
emissions liabilities as had been granted to other primary export industries. Yet, under the 
deal struck between Labour and New Zealand First, they received emissions credits to the 
extent of 50 per cent of their liabilities – a percentage that had never been previously sought 
or touted and which bore no obvious relationship to the levels of relief granted to other 
sectors. It was an arbitrary figure arrived at on the basis of compromise. Similarly, the 
Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill only proceeded to the select committee phase on 
account of a deal between the government and its support parties that would have involved 
granting affected businesses a 50 per cent subsidy to cover costs relating to the proposed 
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trans Tasman regulatory agency. This figure was similarly arbitrary in nature and had not 
featured in the preceding policy and consultation phases (although the issue of regulatory 
costs had done).  
 
These deals are a reality under MMP and pressure groups need to understand the political 
context and configuration of votes that makes them possible. However, it does not create 
any lesser need to ensure pressure group arguments are well supported by information and 
evidence. “Even where politicians are acting politically, they want the fig leaf of the 
analytics” (Clarke 2008) and “maybe there was a time during which people had the 
relationships and just turned up and expected someone to support them just because they 
were all part of the same tribe, but that is certainly not my experience of how it works” 
(Norman 2008). 
 
Second, it is very clear that MMP has influenced the way in which pressure groups need to 
organise and articulate their policy arguments. “All lobbying is about aligning your objectives 
with those of the people you are lobbying” (Hooton 2006). MMP has broadened the range of 
political parties with which pressure groups are required to engage. Consequently, it has 
created a need to tailor arguments according to different political philosophies and 
constituencies. To some extent, there was a requirement under FPP to shape arguments, for 
instance, according to the interests of party factions or based on regional interests, but 
MMP has sharpened this requirement.  
 
The KFA’s campaign and the campaign in opposition to the Therapeutic Products and 
Medicines Bill were notable for their attempt and general success in bringing together 
political support by making the issues relevant to several political parties. For instance, the 
KFA emphasised environmental issues and consequences when engaged with the Green 
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Party, emphasised Treaty implications when engaged with the Maori Party and emphasised 
property rights when engaged with the ACT Party (Hooton 2008). Likewise, broad-based 
Parliamentary opposition to the trans Tasman regulatory agency was achieved through a 
combination of policy arguments that crossed political boundaries. Some of those 
arguments related to consumer choice, some related to compliance costs and some related 
to New Zealand’s need for regulatory autonomy. The need for pressure groups to provide 
more sophisticated information may not have eventuated under MMP, but there has been 
an advantage for those groups that communicate their information with greater 
sophistication and political skill. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
 
MMP has changed the structure and distribution of public policy decision-making power in 
New Zealand and resulted in changes to the behaviour, strategies and influence of pressure 
groups. However, it is important to recognise that in 13 years of MMP government New 
Zealand has experienced a number of different governing arrangements and a highly 
variable configuration and distribution of power.  
 
The public policy case studies reviewed in this thesis predominantly took place during the 
2005-2008 Labour-led term of government. The expert interviews were also undertaken 
during, or shortly after, the 2005-2008 government. That was a minority government 
dependent on support from multiple parties to pass legislation. Decision-making power was 
highly fragmented and policy was often the outcome of inter-party negotiation and 
compromise. It represented a sharp contrast to public policy decision-making under FPP. 
Other MMP governments have not been characterised by the same extent of fragmented 
power, notably the National-New Zealand First coalition majority government (1996-1998). 
Consequently, observations and conclusions in respect to the 2005-2008 government cannot 
be assumed to apply to MMP generally or, at least, not to the same degree.52  
 
The research revealed important shifts that are likely to hold, to a greater or lesser extent, 
under most variations of MMP government. In doing so, the research confirmed several of 
the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2. As expected, and as discussed in Chapter 4, MMP has 
led to pressure groups developing and accessing a wider set of political relationships. It has 
resulted in pressure groups being increasingly willing to challenge Executive policy by openly 
                                                 
52 Furthermore, in respect to public policy, the primary impact of MMP has been on the legislative process. 
Correspondingly, that was the focus of the case studies. Yet governments have other policy levers, which 
pressure groups can also seek to influence. These levers have not been affected by MMP to the same extent as 
legislation.  
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lobbying across Parliament, through select committees and via public campaigns. Further, 
they have often been successful in doing so, particularly where they have been able to 
understand and exploit the political balance of power. Although the bureaucracy remains a 
very important channel of influence for pressure groups, they have found themselves 
increasingly in competition with officials as a source of policy advice and information. 
Information also remains critical to pressure groups, although not noticeably more than it 
was under FPP. Rather, it is the organisation and communication of that information that 
has become more important under MMP. 
 
However, the thesis findings extend beyond examination of the five hypotheses. There are 
also several underlying themes and trends that have arisen from the expert interviews and 
case studies. These provide important insights into pressure group behaviour and the 
requirements for influence under MMP. 
 
Pragmatism, Flexibility, Independence 
 
Pragmatism has become an acknowledged feature of political management under MMP. 
Political leaders have put aside history, personal and ideological differences because it was 
simply required – whether to form governments or hold them together.53 In fact, 
pragmatism has become regarded less a feature of leadership style under MMP and more an 
aspect of leadership necessity. Similarly, pragmatism has been cited as important to 
pressure groups under MMP (Conway 2008, Swain 2008).  As in respect to political 
management, the need for a pragmatic mentality is essentially about necessity, as 
emphasised by Norman:  
                                                 
53 Helen Clark was often described as a political pragmatist, “interested in what would work, not what she 
thought about her coalition partners” (Hubbard 2008). Current Prime Minister John Key is also regarded as a 
pragmatic politician by many (Kissel 2009, Trans Tasman 2009). 
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The key thing is to recognise the fundamental reality of the numbers in Parliament. Since the 
beginning of MMP no party has had a simple majority so there are always multiple parties. 
Talk to everyone. .. first rule of politics – learn to count (Norman 2008).  
 
The distribution of power and the presence of multiple parties have simply required 
pressure groups to engage on a broad front, set philosophical differences aside and 
approach politics on an issue by issue basis. As a consequence, some pressure groups “have 
held their noses” and talked to parties they previously would have avoided (Swain 2008).   
 
Yet it is important not to overstate the concept and value of pragmatism under MMP. It is 
not an MMP phenomenon. If pragmatism is about getting results, then it is true that 
pressure group results were best achieved under FPP through a relatively narrow 
engagement with selected politicians and through strong relationships with allied political 
parties. More accurately, it is flexibility and political independence that have become more 
important to pressure groups under MMP. The value of flexibility was illustrated by a 
number of the public policy case studies. Pressure groups needed the flexibility to work 
across Parliament, craft their policy arguments and propositions according to different 
political audiences and build cross-political blocs of support, as illustrated by both the KFA 
campaign and the campaign in opposition to the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill. 
The value of political independence is fundamentally related.  
 
Some pressure groups will always retain a closer relationship with some political parties 
because of the broad nature of their values and priorities (for example, the Green Party and 
environmental NGOs), or because some political parties are, to some extent, extensions of 
pressure groups (for example, the Labour Party and its affiliated unions). MMP has not fully 
 107
eroded these relationships. However, pressure groups can no longer rely on a single political 
relationship to achieve policy outcomes, even when a government is politically favourable.54  
 
Furthermore, pressure groups are increasingly aware that their own members may have 
different political views and relationships, several of which may now be represented in 
Parliament. These issues are most evident and pronounced in relation to those pressure 
groups that have, historically, had the strongest links to particular parties, such as the unions 
and union movement.55 But they apply across the spectrum of pressure groups.56 
 
Finally, it is apparent that pressure group independence and flexibility is not solely a function 
of necessity in a fragmented political and policy environment. There has also been a cultural 
shift. The need to work across philosophical boundaries and to put historical differences 
aside has reduced the “tribal barriers” (Friedlander 2008) and, in turn, made it increasingly 
natural for pressure groups to engage across the political spectrum. Structural change has 
led to cultural change.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 For instance, Conway noted that the CTU’s relationship with the Green Party has become increasingly 
important and that the Greens have supported almost every policy item of core interest to the CTU during recent 
years (Conway 2008). In fact, the CTU’s 2008 election campaign material even stated the importance of a Green 
Party presence in the next government. 
55 Unite Union leader Matt McCarten has asked “why … under MMP would any other [political] party want to 
help you if all your funding and membership support was going to its competition?” and argued “those unions 
with “blatant” support for Labour are not necessarily furthering the interests – or reflecting the concerns – of 
members. Instead, unions should talk with all parties, even those on the right”. Former Labour Cabinet Minister 
Steve Maharey has observed that MMP has seen some unions approach their own politics differently. “They start 
to think about whether they want to be associated with a political party in the same way. Union leaders will look 
at a crowd and understand that it might include Green Party or Maori Party members rather than believing we 
are a Labour movement here. They are very aware of the fact that they may have a range of voters in their own 
ranks” (Fisher 2008). 
56 Saunders identified Business New Zealand as one pressure group that had worked particularly hard and had 
been successful in retaining its political independence under MMP (Saunders 2008). Friedlander noted that the 
RTF has members with a wide range of political allegiances and that this is in fact an advantage as an organisation 
(Friedlander 2008). 
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Blurring of Insiders and Outsiders 
 
Some pressure groups have retained an institutional status under MMP and remain well 
connected to policy networks and structures. Pressure groups such as the CTU and Business 
New Zealand still resemble insider groups. However, MMP has blurred the boundaries and 
distinctions between insider and outsiders.  
 
First, MMP has provided the opportunity for a different and wider range of pressure groups 
to access the policy process and be closely engaged in policy discussion. This opportunity has 
arisen through the presence in Parliament of more political parties representing different 
political philosophies and constituencies. For example, Zero Waste New Zealand is not a 
classic institutional pressure group. Yet through a close relationship with the Green Party it 
both drafted the original Waste Minimisation Bill and was closely involved in policy 
discussions during the bill’s progress. On the other hand, even the most institutional 
pressure groups can now be left outside the policy process once a bill reaches the point at 
which its fate will be determined through inter-party negotiations (Conway 2008). 
 
Second, MMP has created an environment in which all pressure groups are more likely to 
consider and utilise the full range of influence strategies, both direct and indirect. 
Relationships with the Executive still matter and aggressive, indirect, high profile 
campaigning can still jeopardise those relationships. Furthermore, many policy outcomes are 
still achieved through direct engagement with officials and the Executive outside the public 
eye. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of decision-making power has created an incentive for 
pressure groups to campaign in order to create a political platform for government support 
parties or those parties holding political leverage in respect to a particular bill. In addition, 
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the more limited power of the Executive has reduced the risks to pressure groups that 
aggressively confront government policy. 
 
Complexity and Sophistication 
 
The public policy decision-making process is more complex under MMP (Clarke 2008, 
Saunders 2008), particularly in a minority government environment. It is more complex on 
account of legislation requiring support from multiple parties. It is more complex on account 
of the need for inter-party negotiations at different stages in the policy process and the 
interface between those negotiations and the select committee process. And it is more 
complex because the configuration and degree of Parliamentary support for a bill can be 
very fluid. It may change several times during the life of a bill and not be resolved until the 
final hour.  
 
Complexity is a feature of all of the public policy case studies examined. The scrap metal 
industry’s lobbying in respect to the Waste Minimisation Bill required engagement with 
several parties, required an awareness of the balance of votes and involved various 
supplementary order papers. GPG’s campaign also required knowledge of the balance of 
power in respect to the Taxation Bill and how it could be exploited. Indeed, Green Party 
leader Jeannette Fitzsimons has made particular reference to GPG’s “very skilled lobbyists” 
(Fitzsimons 2006). The KFA brought together a range of different propositions for different 
political parties (for example, environmental to the Greens, property rights to ACT, Maori 
forestry assets to the Maori Party). The fishing industry’s success in regard to the ETS can be 
attributed to its awareness of the political dynamics of the ETS legislation, and how support 
for the legislation shifted, as well as awareness of the opportunity to access New Zealand 
First in the final stages of its ETS negotiations with the Labour Party. SMRANZ, GPG and the 
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KFA were all advised by public law or government relations consultancies and the fishing 
industry’s lobbying was carried out by SEAFIC, an industry association very familiar with the 
policy decision-making process and regularly engaged with government and Parliament. It is 
unlikely the policy wins achieved by these pressure groups could have been accomplished 
without a significant political expertise and understanding of the MMP policy decision-
making process. 
 
It seems this complexity has created a different type of ‘insider’ pressure group, those 
groups with significant political expertise or the resources to procure that expertise. 
Relationships may be less influential under MMP, but sophistication is more important and 
there is a general view that MMP has contributed to an increased demand for specialist 
lobbying and public law advice57 . The reasons given relate to MMP’s greater complexity, 
plus the additional time and resources required in implementing an effective MMP influence 
strategy (Saunders 2008, Clarke 2008).58  Interestingly, there has also been a tendency 
towards the appointment of former politicians as pressure group leaders.59  
 
Pragmatism, flexibility, political independence, political knowledge and sophistication – their 
influence and value are not limited to MMP. However, MMP has sharpened their influence 
on public policy and importance to pressure groups. A pressure group’s ability to work 
across political parties, build ad hoc alliances with different interests, their understanding of 
the numbers in Parliament, the political dynamics of an issue and, in particular, the potential 
                                                 
57 Saunders also noted that the trigger for establishing Saunders Unsworth (a specialist public policy and 
government relations consultancy) was the 1993 MMP referendum. Clarke commented that MMP cannot take 
credit for the emergence of the specialist field of public law (which had its origins overseas), but that MMP did 
increase the “scale and size” of the opportunity for public lawyers and tools available to them. 
58 Conway also noted the additional time and resource requirements of MMP as a challenge. 
59 For instance, the former Chief Executive of Federated Farmers was ex National MP and author of The Good 
Lobbyist, Annabel Young.  The current Chief Executive of the New Zealand Food and Grocery Council is a former 
National Party MP, Katherine Rich. The current Chief Executive of the New Zealand Business Council for 
Sustainable Development is a former Labour Party Cabinet Minister, Peter Neilson. Former ACT MP Ken Shirley 
was once Chief Executive of the Forest Owners Association and is now Executive Director of Organics Aotearoa. 
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leverage points, will all have some influence on their ability to achieve results. And while the 
erosion of some “tribal” barriers in conjunction with the arrival of new parties in Parliament 
has levelled the playing field by opening doors and possibilities for different pressure groups, 
MMP’s complexity has also created advantages for the professional lobby groups, those with 
political expertise, those familiar with the policy process or those able to procure specialist 
advice.  
 
On 20 October, Minister of Justice Simon Power confirmed a referendum on the future of 
MMP would be held in conjunction with the 2011 general election. "If a majority of voters 
opt for a change from MMP, there will be a second referendum at the 2014 general election. 
This will be a contest between MMP and the alternative voting system that receives the 
most votes in the first referendum. It will be binding” (Power 2009). 
 
Power’s announcement was expected and satisfied one of the National Party’s 2008 election 
campaign commitments. The reaction was relatively muted. Even the response of those 
Parliamentary parties with most at stake, the smaller ones, was low key. They broadly, if in 
some cases cautiously, accepted Power’s proposed referendum process (NZPA 2009[a]). A 
dissenting view was provided by longstanding MMP critic and one of the key protagonists at 
the time of the 1993 MMP referendum, Peter Shirtcliffe. Shirtcliffe, who fronted the 1993 
campaign to retain FPP, criticised the proposed referendum process as for being “far too 
prolonged” and claimed it is the "referendum you have when Parliament does not want you 
to have a referendum" (NZPA 2009[b]).  
 
It can be expected that those who have benefited from MMP will put the case for its 
retention in the lead-up to the 2011 referendum and, if required, campaign vigorously in 
2014. Some of the minor Parliamentary parties, notably the Green Party, are likely to be at 
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the forefront of any such campaign. They should be joined by those ‘non-institutional’ 
pressure groups - the former ‘outsiders’ - who have enjoyed more opportunities for 
influence under MMP. They might also be quietly supported by some of the government 
relations consultants and public law experts whose expertise has become more valuable 
under MMP. Of course, this will be one scenario in relation to which these experts will not 
be able to deploy their MMP savvy and awareness of MMP’s Parliamentary dynamics. 
Referendums are the rare exception - legislation without the legislature.  
 
Another who will evidently be hoping for the retention of MMP (or, at least, no return to 
FPP) is the Christchurch Press’ Political Editor, Colin Espiner. “I think Parliament is a far richer 
place for the presence of the smaller parties”, he declared in response to the referendum 
announcement (Espiner 2009). Based on the findings and conclusions of this thesis, Espiner 
might also have described Parliament as more influential, more competitive, more complex, 
less predictable and, in respect to pressure groups, more important. 
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Appendix A – Interview Template 
 
Indicative Questions 
 
MMP Observations 
 
• How has MMP changed public policy decision-making? 
• How has it affected the distribution of power? How has it affected the decision 
process/system? 
• Has it strengthened Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive? 
 
Pressure Group Strategy – General 
 
• How has MMP changed the ways that pressure groups deal with ‘government’? 
• Have pressure groups effectively understood and adapted to MMP? 
• Has there been more competition amongst pressure groups or do the traditional 
power blocs still dominate access and policy? 
 
Pressure Group Strategy – Relationships and Access 
 
• How much do relationships matter to policy influence?  
• To what extent have pressure groups sought to foster a broad range of political 
relationships under MMP? Have they done so effectively? 
• Has the nature of political relationships between pressure groups and political 
parties changed under MMP? To what extent, if any, are pressure groups politically 
tribal? To what extent does the politics of the individual guide the politics of the 
group? 
 
Pressure Group Strategy – Information 
 
• Has MMP made having good, robust policy information more important (as per 
argument about longer, more heavily scrutinised policy process)? 
• Is there a strong demand for “intellectual, policy, economic” information within 
Parliament?   
• Do pressure groups put an emphasis on quality information? Have they done more 
so under MMP? 
 
Pressure Group Strategy – Politics, Public Policy, Public Opinion 
 
• Is the politics of MMP more complex?  
• Has MMP increased the extent to which pressure groups attempt to play politics and 
play parties off against each other?  
• How important is it for pressure groups to understand the political priorities, 
philosophies and constituencies of the different parties? To what extent have they 
done so? 
• To what extent have pressure groups under MMP attempted to present policy that 
has broader political appeal?  
• Is policy more sensitive to public opinion under MMP? How? 
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• Do you think pressure groups have become more actively engaged in public relations 
under MMP? What success have they had? 
 
Pressure Groups – Select Committees 
 
• How has the role of select committees changed under MMP? Have they become 
more influential? 
• To what extent have members of select committees become more “independent”? 
What role does the party play in shaping select committee outcomes?  
• Have pressure groups utilised select committees effectively under MMP? 
 
Pressure Groups – The Bureaucracy 
 
• How has the role and influence of the bureaucracy changed under MMP? Is advice 
more contestable? Do they face competition for advice? 
• Have pressure groups attempted to circumvent the bureaucracy by engaging directly 
with support parties? Has this weakened the influence of the bureaucracy? 
 
Other 
 
• What are the other issues/trends/developments of note in relation to pressure 
group strategy under MMP? 
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Appendix B – Brief Interviewee Biographies 
 
 
Paul Swain 
 
Paul Swain first entered Parliament as the Labour Party member for Eastern Hutt in 1990 
and served 18 years as a Member of Parliament. He served as a Cabinet Minister between 
1999 and 2005 in a range of roles, including Minister for Communications, Transport, State 
Owned Enterprises, Immigration and Labour. He stood down from Cabinet for family reasons 
after the 2005 election but remained an MP until 2008. He now works in a mixture of 
advisory and consulting roles.  
 
Barrie Saunders 
 
Barrie Saunders is Managing Director of public policy consultancy Saunders Unsworth. He 
has had an extensive career in the public policy, media and political arenas. Following 
working in journalism in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom he became the first 
editor of the National Business Review in 1970.  He was subsequently Press Secretary to the 
Labour Party Leader (1976-79), Public Relations Manager for the New Zealand 
Manufacturers Federation (1979-83), the Meat Producers Board Group Manager Public 
Relations (1983-86) and North American Director for the Board based in New York (1986-
90). He started business in 1990 as a consultant and current clients include 15 port company 
CEOs in what is a virtual organisation, the six largest institutes of technology as well as 
industry organisations. 
 
Tim Clarke 
 
Tim Clarke leads national law firm Russell McVeagh's Public Law & Policy practice. He has 15 
years experience in providing advice to private and public sector entities on public law and 
government relations issues. This advice has been across a wide range of sectors (such as 
electricity, banking, telecommunications, forestry, pastoral farming, shipping & ports, rail, 
kiwifruit) and issues (including tax, economic regulation, financial services regulation, 
competition law, sports law and many more). Tim has economics and law degrees from 
Otago University, and a Masters degree in law from the University of Cambridge. 
 
Sue Kedgley 
 
Sue Kedgley has been a Green Party MP since 1999 and is currently spokesperson on a range 
of issues, including local government, food and health. She spearheaded the Parliamentary 
side of the campaign to oppose the Therapeutic Products and Medicines Bill. Previously, she 
was a Wellington City Councillor for 7 years, a TV reporter/director/producer for 8 years, 
and worked for 8 years in the United Nations Secretariat. 
 
Tony Friedlander 
 
Tony Friedlander was elected as the National Party member for New Plymouth in 1975, an 
electorate he represented until 1987. He is also a former National Party Cabinet Minister. 
Since leaving Parliament, he has served as the longstanding Chief Executive of the Road 
Transport Forum, which represents the interests of the road freight transport sector. 
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Russel Norman 
 
Russel Norman has been co-leader of the Green Party since June 2006 and entered 
Parliament in 2008. He is spokesperson on a number of policy portfolios, including 
economics and climate change. Previously, he had been involved with the Green Party in a 
range of roles, including Parliamentary advisor, Party Convenor and Treasurer and 2005 
election Campaign Manager.  
 
Charles Chauvel 
 
Charles Chauvel is currently the Labour Party spokesperson on Energy and Climate Change. 
He was first elected to Parliament on the Labour Party list in 2005 and, in his first term, 
served as Chair of the important Finance and Expenditure Select Committee. It was this 
committee that considered the Emissions Trading Scheme legislation. Chauvel was 
previously a lawyer and prior to entering Parliament headed up the public law and 
employment law teams at Minter Ellison Rudd Watts. He is also a past Deputy Chair of 
Meridian Energy.  
 
Matthew Hooton 
 
Matthew Director is Managing Director of Exceltium Public Affairs Consultancy, which 
specialises in government relations and political strategy. Hooton is a former senior National 
Party advisor. He is also a regular political media pundit and commentator. 
 
Peter Conway 
 
Peter Conway was elected CTU Secretary in 2009. For the previous 9 years he had been CTU 
Economist, more recently, CTU Director of Policy. Conway has been active in unions since 
1977. He has been assistant national secretary of the New Zealand Distribution Workers 
Federation, an advocate for retail workers in the National Distribution Union, as well as a 
director of Auckland’s Yellow Bus Company. He is on the board of New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise and is Chair of Oxfam NZ. 
 
Doug Bailey 
 
Doug Bailey is a consultant with national law firm Russell Mcveagh. He specialises in the 
fields of public law and public policy. Doug has an LLB from the University of Auckland, an 
MA from Canterbury University and LLM from the Northwestern University in Chicago. 
